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Reliability Improvement Warranties illustrate a new
contractual technique for improving reliability by providing
a strong monetary incentive to the contractor. This incen-
tive, however, also places additional monetary risk on the
contractor. Industry has expressed mounting concerns over
this risk. This thesis contains an examination of the
relationship between government benefits and contractor
risk. Existing and proposed RIW contracts are evaluated
in regard to the type of equipment under warranty, the use
of exclusions, penalties for non-compliance, and RIW price.
The results of the analysis illustrate how RIW is being
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I. INTRODUCTION
The need to improve combat effectiveness and reduce
skyrocketing equipment support costs has been recognized
as a major problem by the Department of Defense. The
problem exists because performances and acquisition costs
have become the driving factors behind the procurement of
new weapon systems. Reliability requirements have not
been integrated with the design effort and usually have
been designated for demonstration only at the conclusion
of full scale development. The demonstration was normally
conducted in a laboratory environment that had little
resemblance to the actual environment the equipment was
faced with in the field. Contractors viewed this demonstra-
tion as the only reliability hurdle their equipment had to
pass and were strongly motivated to design to the benign
test environment. Because the government was intimately
involved with the contractor during the design effort and
frequently initiated design changes, responsibility for
reliability became diffused. Original reliability standards
were not enforced and sometimes were lowered when it became
apparent they could not be met. Contractors, who have been
capable of designing and producing reliable hardware, did
not do so because their rewards were realized from producing
a high performance system for the least possible cost and
not from the production of reliable equipment.

A. OBJECTIVE OF RIW
In a joint memorandiim dated 14 August 1974, the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (I&L) stated that the objective of RIW is:
"... to motivate and provide an incentive
to contractors to design and produce
equipment which will have low failure
rates and low repair costs during field/
operational use. This technique attempts,
through the use of contractual agreements
(which extend for several years after
government acceptance of the equipment)
to provide an incentive for contractors
to improve the reliability of their
equipment and to reduce repair costs in
order to maximize their profits. Thus
the intent of the RIW contracting technique
is to realize improved operational
reliability and maintainability of DOD
systems and equipments for each additional
dollar that the contractor earns. For
these reasons, a RIW is not a maintenance
contract and should not be used for this
purpose.
"
The proper application of RIW should therefore result
in the acquisition of equipment that has been designed and
produced to have a low initial failure rate in the field .
This initial failure rate will be lowered even further during
the warranty period due to the incentive the RIW provides
the contractor. The maximum benefits from RIW are therefore
expected to be realized during the initial years of an
equipment deployment. At the end of the warranty period
the government can either extend the warranty or assume its
own organic maintenance. It is anticipated that at the end
of the warranty period the reliability of the equipment will
10

have grown to a point where the number and costs of repairs
are much lower than if the government had not applied the
warranty and assumed its own organic maintenance when the
equipment was initially introduced.
B. RIW DEFINITION
A Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW) is a fixed
price commitment that obligates the contractor to repair
or replace, within a specified time, all warranted equipment
that fails during the period of coverage. Ideally, RIW
motivates the contractor to increase reliability in order
to decrease his repair warranty costs and maximize his
profits. In a pure RIW contract the contractor is not
obligated to provide equipment that demonstrates a specified
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) . Instead the price of a
warranty is calculated using an "expected" MTBF. If the
field MTBF falls below this level the contractor will not
realize a profit since the increased number of failures
increase his repair costs. An increase in MTBF above the
"expected" level will, in the same manner, decrease his
repair costs and increase his profit. The contractor is
therefore motivated to increase the MTBF of the equipment
as much as possible if the realized savings from decreased
repair costs are greater than the cost of improving the
MTBF.
A RIW may also be used in association with a MTBF
guarantee as part of the warranty agreement. This arrangement
11

requires the contractor to guarantee that a stated MTBF
will be experienced by the equipment in the field. Failure
to meet this guarantee level requires the contractor to
institute corrective action and provide additional spares
to the government until the MTBF improves.
In any case the RIW provisions should be established as
a separate line item in the contract so that the cost of the
warranty can be evaluated. In the case of RIW with a MTBF
guarantee the additional cost of the MTBF guarantee option
should also be established as a separate line item so that
the additional protection of the guarantee also may be
evaluated for cost effectiveness.
Although RIW can be used to improve the reliability of
equipment already in the field by applying the warranty to
an equipment overhaul contract, the major benefits arise
from using the concept in the initial production contract
for new equipment.
C. RIW AND THE SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE
Although application of an RIW is associated with a
production contract, it is important that the concept be
considered early in an equipment's life cycle since a
decision to use RIW will affect the configuration and design
as well as the planning needed to obtain and support the
warranted item. The interface of warranty activities with




































During the conceptual stage studies are usually made
that include the relationship of reliability, maintainability
and expected life cycle cost. RIW as well as other methods
should be considered as a means of achieving goals and con-
trolling costs. In some cases a more traditional approach
of specifying a design MTBF will be more appropriate. This
is especially true for equipments that do not meet RIW
application criteria (Table 1) . Another option is to com-
pare Target Logistic Support cost with Measured Logistic
Support Cost, a method that will be discussed in the F-16
contract between the U.S. Air Force and General Dynamics.
The Development Concept Paper (DCP) should include instruc-
tions or requirements for the use of such control techniques.
During the Validation Phase, consideration is given to
required reliability levels and their impact on system
support. Consideration should also be given to methods that
can be used to achieve reliability levels. At this point,
equipment candidates for RIW should be screened to determine
if application criteria are met. Assuming the results of
this initial screening are positive, an economic analysis
should be carried out on each candidate to determine the
The DCP is a coordinated, management document which
serves as the vehicle for the Secretary of Defense's decision
on major development programs; the record of primary program
information, decision rationale, and decision review






compiled from criteria stated by OSD(I&L), Army
Material Command, and Naval Air Systems Command
1. Warranty can be obtained at price commensurate with the
contemplated value of the warranty work to be accomplished.
2. Moderate to high initial support costs are involved.
3. Unit is generally self contained, immune from induced
failures from outside units, and has readily identifiable
failure characteristics.
4. Unit is readily transportable to permit return to vendor's
plant or contractor can provide field service for it.
5. Expected operating time and use environment known.
6. Can be contracted for on a fixed price basis.
7. Contract can be structured for a warranty period of
several years so contractor has time to identify and
analyze failures to permit reliability and m.aintainability
improvements
.
8. Unit has potential for reliability growth and reduction
in repair costs.
9. Potential contractors indicate cooperative attitude
toward RIW acceptance and evaluation of effectiveness.
10. Enough units are to be procured to make RIW cost effective.
11. Unit is configured to discourage unauthorized field
repair, preferably sealed and capable of containing
elapsed time indicator.
12. Reasonable assurance of high use of item.
13. Unit permits contractor to effect no cost ECP ' s subsequent-
to government approval.
14. Failure data and operational use data can be furnished
contractor and updated periodically through life of warranty
15. Field reliability, costs to support, and reliability
growth are reasonably predictable.
16. Terms of RIW can be tailored so that risks and rewards
to government and industry are acceptable.
17. Spare part requirements are difficult to predict.
18. Cost of the RIW can be separately priced.
19. Multiple-year procurement (competitive or sole source)
is feasible.
20. Unit is equipped with an elapsed time indicator;
otherwise, the warranty must be based on calendar time,
or some other means of determining usage.
15

economic feasibility of the warranty and the desired warranty
period. Initial warranty provisions should then be deter-
mined. In order to communicate to the contractor the inten-
tion that a warranty provision is being considered, the
Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Full-Scale Development
Phase should contain a sample warranty provision intended
for use in the production contract. The RFP should also ask
respondents to discuss their understanding of the warranty
provision and how they would operate under the warranty
program.
During the Development Phase, initial economic feasi-
bility studies and warranty provisions should be updated
to reflect program and equipment changes. At the end of
this phase warranty provisions are incorporated into the
production RFP. The warranty proposals provided by the
responding contractors are then evaluated and a final deci-
sion made regarding the intention to use RIW. If the deci-
sion is made to apply RIW, the source selection activity,
uses the contractor's warranty proposal information as an
integral part of its evaluation criteria.
During the Production Phase a plan to administer the
warranty must be developed. The plan should include pro-
visions for:
1. How the flow of the warranted equipment from the




2. User indoctrination for processing the warrantied
equipment.
3. Requirements for receiving inspection, and
documentation at the contractor plant.
4
.
Requirements for the contractors and government data
system.
5. Offices responsible for the contract administration
should be identified and be supplied proper data for
administering the warranty.
6. Methods for expeditious processing of Engineering
2Change Proposals (ECP's) must be established.
7. If required, the contractor's repair and storage
facilities should be reviewed.
8. Technical data review to insure that contractor
has placed notice of the warranty and warranty procedures
in the applicable technical publication.
9. Review of Warranty Marking and Seals.
During the Operational Phase the warranty should be
monitored to insure that no problems develop in the overall
logistic flow of the equipment. If problems develop.
2An ECP is a proposal to make an alteration m the
physical or functional characteristics of an item delivered,




adjustments to the original warranty procedures may be
required, however, if there is a change in the RIW contract
it must be renegotiated and additional cost may be incurred.
Before the end of the warranty period an evaluation should
be conducted to determine if the warranty should be extended.
The original terms and conditions of the RIW should be
reviewed to determine if they are still applicable, A new
warranty agreement must be negotiated with the contractor
and a decision made to either extend the warranty or convert
to organic maintenance. If a decision is made to convert
to organic maintenance the conversion should be monitored
to insure that test equipment, technical data/publications,
spares, training, and maintenance facilities are provided
to the government within the terms of the initial agreement.
A RIW provision for an equipment overhaul contract must
pass through most of the same procedures, however, since
the equipment is already in the field these actions are taken
during the operation phase (Figure 2) and do not have an
effect on equipment design,
D. POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM RIW
Potential benefits to both the government and the contrac-
tor are anticipated from the use of RIW.
1, Benefits to the Government .
a. Incentives and responsibility for field reliability











































2b. Greater emphasis placed on Life Cycle Cost.
c. Contractor is responsible for keeping all units
up to the same configuration,
d. There is an increased incentive for the contrac-
tor to introduce design/production changes that will increase
the MTBF of the equipment and result in reliability growth.
e. An incentive for reduction in repair costs is
provided, since any reduction in labor hours or material
costs used in repairing the equipment will increase the
contractor's profits.
f. Minimal initial investment for support equipment
is required by the government, since the contractor is to
provide repair services during the warranty period.
g. RIW usage may reduce requirements for skilled
military maintenance and support manpower.
2. Benefits to the Contractor .
a. Increased profit potential when MTBF is improved
above pricing base.
b. Multi-year guaranteed repair business during
the warranty period.
c. The contractor becomes more familiar with the
operational reliability and maintainability of his equipment,
which should help him in obtaining follow-on contracts.
3
The total cost to the government for the development,
acquisition, operation and logistic support of a system




The major concern about the use of RIW has been the
monetary risk to which a contractor may be exposed. The
risk is caused by uncertainty in the field failure rate of
the warranted equipment. The key element in the contrac-
tor's pricing of a RIW is the predicted number of returned
items the contractor will have to process and repair during
the warranty period. If the contractor's estimate of this
rate of return is too low he can suffer a decrease in profits
or even a monetary loss. Conversely, if his estimate is too
high and he prices the RIW accordingly he stands to lose the
contract to a lower bidder, or if he is awarded the contract
will experience excess profits. New equipment, for which no
field failure data is available, is the riskiest to warrant,
while equipment which has been deployed and which has a
known field failure rate provides the least risk. As men-
tioned previously, however, the anticipated RIW benefits
for the government are greater for new equipment than for
equipment already in the field. The balance between risk
and benefits can be partially maintained by the price of
the RIW and various contract clauses or exclusions that
attempt to lower uncertainty.
21

II. INTERRELATIONSHIPS OR RIW WITH FIELD RELIABILITY,
CONTRACTOR RISK, AND GOVERl^JMENT COST
A. RIW AND FIELD RELIABILITY
RIW seeks to improve combat effectivenss by improving
field reliability. One of the problems associated with
this approach is defining field reliability in terms that
can be measured. Historically, reliability values have
been stated in terras of Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)
which describes the expected number of failures due to
inherent system design. The design specifications for
reliability normally include specific environmental condi-
tions such as temperature, vibration and humidity. Unfor-
tunately, the projected reliability performance based on
these specifications has been much higher, often by a factor
of ten or more, than the reliability experienced by the
equipment in the field (Figure 3) . The reasons for this
discrepancy are easy to identify but hard to correct. A
large proportion of field failures are due to causes which
are hard to define in specifications (Figure 4) . Even if
all field failure causes could be identified and included
in the reliability specifications, a demonstration test to
show that these specifications had been met would have to
be a full field test utilizing operational personnel and
conducted in an operational environment. The time and money






































"Evaluation of Environmental Profiles for Reliability
Demonstration," RADC-TR-7 5-2 42 , Rome Air Development Center,








Figure 4. Avionics Equipment Failure Causes
A. Dantowitz, G. Hirschberger , and D. Pravidlo,
"Analysis of Aeronautical Equipment Environmental Failures,"
Technical Report AFFDL-TR- 71-22 , Air Force Flight Dynamics
Laboratory, Air Force Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio, May 1971.
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RIW attempts to solve this problem by obligating the
contractor to repair all equipment that is returned to him
during the warranty period for a fixed price. Although
certain failure classifications may be excluded, the effect
of RIW is that the contractor must consider the field relia-
bility of his equipment. In order to make a profit, the
contractor must analyze these failures and improve the
reliability of the equipment through ECPs. Extensive
environmental, operational and field data is provided to
the contractor to aid his effort.
Since any corrective maintenance action in the field
constitutes a field failure, fewer exclusions force the
contractor to deal with a more realistic approximation of
the actual field failure rate. Even with a large number
of exclusions this rate is more reflective of the actual
field failure rate than the old method of specifying inherent
design MTBF since more failure categories are included.
B. IMPACT OF RIW ON COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
Combat effectiveness can be defined as the product of
three factors; performance of the system, the availability .
of the system, and the mission reliability of the system,
RIW impacts on the latter two components (Figure 5)
.
Availability, which is a probability measure of the system
being up when it is needed, is defined as the ratio of the
equipments up time (reliability) and its down time (main-
tainability) . Since the main objective of RIW is to increase
25

Effectiveness = Performance x Availability x Reliability
RIW can impact these
two components
Availabilitv = MTBF MTBF - Common Measure of
^ MTBF+MTTR Reliability
MTTR (Mean time to repair)
Common Measure of
Maintainability
(1) Through incentive of RIW MTBF can
be increased, the wider the warranty
coverage (less exclusions) the
closer MTBF approaches field
MTBF
(2) RIW indirectly decreases MTTR
(a) Built in test equipment makes failure
diagnosis easy.
(b) Black box replacement makes field
replacement easy
(c) Fixed price incentive causes contractor
to try to keep repairs simple and cheap
(d) Specified turn around times keep supply
delays down
Reliability: Electronic components generally have
constant failure rates. So
R = e X = MTBF
Mechanical systems, unfortunately, do not
exhibit constant failure rates, however,
their failure rates are often approximated
by using a constant failure rate over a
specified time interval.
(1) Through incentive of RIW MTBF can be increased,
the wider the warranty coverage (less exclusions)
the closer MTBF approaches field MTBF.
Figure 5. RIW Impact on Combat Effectiveness
26

reliability, availability is also increased. To a lesser
extent RIW can lead to a decrease in down time, further
improving availability. The mission reliability of the
system is a measure of the probability that the system will
remain up during the mission duration. Since this term is
inversely proportional to the failure rate and RIW lowers
the failure rate, this term is also increased. Clauses in
new contracts frequently contain exclusions for damages to
equipment caused by mishandling, improper installation,
improper operation and unverified failures. The use of
these and similar exclusion cause availability and relia-
bility to be less reflective of actual operational values,
therefore, the most effective warranty, from the government's
viewpoint is one that has no exclusions.
C. IMPACT ON DESIGN
The maximum government benefits would come from applying
RIW to procurement of new equipment because the contractor
can then consider reliability in his design effort and make
tradeoffs regarding production cost, reliability and repair
costs where they will have their maximum effect. The equip-
ment should, therefore have an initial failure rate that is
lower than equipment procured under other methods. This
failure rate will be further lowered during the warranty
period. An RIW applied to an overhaul contract is less
effective in this regard since the contractor is dealing
with an existing design. Although he can make ECP ' s that




D. LIFE CYCLE COSTS
A general equation for describing Life Cycle Cost is
LCC = Research & Development + Production +
Cost Cost
Operating + Support + Retirement
Cost Cost Cost
RIW alters the emphasis the contractor places on the first
three terms on the right hand side of this equation. Under
the traditional method of specifying a design MTBF the con-
tractors main concern is to keep development and production
costs as low as possible. Under RIW, however, the contractor
is forced to consider his repair costs once the equipment
is put in the field. This effects development costs
indirectly. Development costs are effected since the con-
tractor is given the incentive to consider reliability
during the design stage. He will devote more effort in this
direction which will result in added development cost.
Production cost usually will be increased also as better
quality material is used and the contractor uses better
quality assurance and testing techniques. If the design
effort leads the contractor to develop less complex equipment,
however, his production cost could go down. The cost of the
production contract, however, will be higher since the cost
of the RIW clause will be added to the cost of producing
28

the equipment. Operating and support costs will be decreased
since the price of the RIW includes repair costs for the
warranty period. Post warranty operating and support costs
should also be decreased since the RIW acts to increase
reliability.
The overall effect of a RIW contract should be to drive
the total costs of the system toward the low point on the
total cost curve (Figure 6) . Applying RIW to a contract
does not guarantee reaching this point, however. The
answer lies in performing an accurate economic analysis to
determine the cost savings that are expected prior to appli-
cation and choosing the least expensive alternative. If
the RIW alternative is chosen another evaluation can be per-
formed to determine the actual cost savings at the end of
the warranty period.
Although an RIW may not reduce system life cycle cost,
it does have the benefit of providing more certainty con-
cerning repair cost over the warranty period. This factor
coupled with the increase in field reliability provided by
RIW is a considerable benefit that is hard to measure in
monetary terms but should also be considered in determining
if a RIW should be used.
E. INDUSTRY CONCERNS
The Council of Defense and Space Industry Association
(CODSIA) has been the primary spokesman for expressing
industry concerns over use of RIW. The primary concern
29

Life Cycle Costs = Developnent + Production + Opeiiating + System
Costs Costs Support Petirorient
Costs Costs
(As a rule of thumb: [Operating and <_ 5 [Development and )
Support Costs ] Production Costs]
RIW CAN INCREASE:
Development Costs indirectly by causing contractor
to devote more effort to reliability
Production Costs - indirectly by causing contractor to use
better material, having better Q.A.
,
better testing
- directly by adding cost of RIW to
production contract
RIW CAN DECREASE:
Operating + Support Costs - directly by increasing MTBF






Figure 6. RIW Impact on Life Cycle Costs
?n

expressed by this group revolves around the monetary risk
the contractor is exposed to when an RIW is used. The
risk is greatest when RIW is applied to the first production
contract of new "state of the art" equipment since no actual
field failure data is available and the uncertainty in
predicting the expected field failure rate is high. Con-
versely this is the type of equipment where the government
expects to gain the most from RIW application (Figure 7)
.
The uncertainty in predicting the field failure rate is
increased by the "broadness of the warranty" since failures
due to other than inherent design defects become increasingly
difficult to predict. Industry, therefore, would prefer
RIW warranties with a large number of exclusions. The
government, on the other hand, prefers a broad warranty
since it has a greater impact on field reliability and is
easier to administer. The opposite positions of the govern-
ment and industry are depicted in Figure 8
.
If new equipment were to be covered by RIW, CODSIA has
proposed the use of a cost plus incentive fee type contract
to cover initial production. The incentive fee would be
based on meeting a target MTBF. A fixed price RIW would
then be applied to the equipment after field failure rate
data becomes available. Industry also feels that RIW con-
tracts provide harsh penalties if specified turnaround times
are not met. These penalties usually obligate the contractor









































Figure 7 . Contractor Risk and Government
Benefits for Differing Types of



























Figure 8. Contrast of Government Benefits - Contractor




cost, until the turnaround time improves or assess the
contractor monetary penalty for each day late. The
penalties are made even harsher by a RIW contract that
includes a MTBF guarantee since if the MTBF values are not
met, additional spares must be provided until the MTBF is
improved
,
The government desires these features in a RIW contract
since a short turnaround time decreases its need for spares.
The inclusion of a MTBF guarantee in a RIW contract also
affords added protection to the government. Specifically/
it may force the contractor to make an ECP to meet the stated
MTBF, whereas, under a straight RIW the contractor may choose
not to make the change since it would be less expensive for
him to continue making repairs. This is especially true
near the end of a warranty period where an ECP is less cost
effective for the contractor. The differing viewpoints of
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RIW contracts listed in Tables 3 and 4 were evaluated
in terms of the following categories:
1. Nature of Equipment
a. New state of art for a new purpose.
b. State of art improvement over existing equipment.
c. New military application of commercial "off
the shelf equipment".
d. Additional procurement of existing military
equipment.
e. Overhaul contract, applied to existing military
equipment already in field.
2. Exclusion clauses.
3. Use of MTBF guaranties and penalties
4
.
Turnaround time and penalties
5. Price
6. MTBF improvement realized.
Additionally, the difference in price between sole source
and competitive contacts was compared, the contracts were
evaluated in terms of contractor risk and potential govern-
ment benefit, the changes in RIW application since the 1974
memorandum by DDR&E and OSD(I&L) were analyzed and the use of
RIW by the three armed services was compared. Finally, the
cost effectiveness of the only completed long term RIW con-
tract, the first USN(ASO/LSI overhaul contract for the —
AJB-3 gyro) , was evaluated.
36

Table 3. Long Term RIW Contracts (>4 years)
Item Manufacturer Service Year
Warranty
Period
CN494A/AJB-3 I£I USN(ASO) 1967-first 5 yrs/1500 hrs
contract per unit


















(1) Collins USAF 1975 5 years





USAF 1976-under 4 years/300,000
negotiation operating hours
(1) Contract includes MTBF guarantee
(2) Contract has three options: RIW













USN 1972 26 months/lOOO
operating hours











Honeywell USN (NAVAIR) 1972 2 years/1500
operating hours
INS Carousel Deloo USAF 1972 1 year
(1) Contains MTBF guarantee
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The contracts were separated into two groups, long term
(over 4 years) and short term (under 26 months) for purposes
of the evaluation since the shorter term contracts do not
represent full potential of RIW. These contracts are
included in the study, however, since they do represent
application of RIW.
A. CONTRACTS
CN494A/AJB-3 Gyro, Contract between Naval Aviation
Supply Office and Lear Siegler (LSI)
This was the first military use of RIW and represents
the only completed RIW contract for which a large data base
exists. The contract, signed in 1967, covered the repair of
80 gyros for a five year period. The gyros had been in
field use for a number of years and were being repaired
commercially by LSI and General Electric so actual field
failure and cost to repair data could be calculated. Addi-
tionally, the 800 gyros placed under warranty represented
only about one third of the total gyro population so a
direct comparison could be made between warranted and
unwarranted units. Possible savings to the Navy were based
upon the achievement of 1.2 million operating hours or
1500 hrs/unit during the five year period. The initial MTBF
was calculated to be 400 hours and the target MTBF was set
at 520 hours. The total cost of the RIW was estimated to
be $3,444 million based upon the induction of 800 "new"
gyros at a cost of $4305 per unit. A savings of $686,000,
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or 57<: per operating hour was projected. This contract was
completed in 1973 and a follow-on contract with LSI negotiated
for the original 800 gyros. The follow-on contract has four
major differences. The contract price is lower ($2.5
million, vice $3.44 million), operating time of 1.2 million
hours is based on the total units covered and not limited to
1500 hours per unit, the calendar time period has been ex-
tended to six years, and the Navy has the option of including
additional gyros under the contract if it is seen that utili-
zation will not meet the anticipated 1.2 million operating
hours over the six year period [Ref . 26] . The cost of the
second contract is lower due to the reduction in repair time
which resulted from reliability improvements made to the
gyros during the first contract. The cost of the first
contract was based on an average repair time of 75 hours
per gyro. The cost of the second contract was negotiated
with a repair time of only 4 5 hours.
A24G-27 Gyro, Contract between USAF and LSI
In 1969 the Air Force signed a RIW contract with LSI
for maintenance of 12 8 gyros used in the Fill aircraft.
The contract is for a 5 year or 3,000 operating hours per
unit period and was the result of a competitive procurement
between LSI and General Electric. This contract represented
an additional procurement of gyros that were already in
field use. The cost effectiveness of the contract would
therefore be directly evaluated against non-warranted units.
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The \init production cost of the gyro was $6040 and the
warranty cost is $2200 which represents a repair cost of
7.3% of unit price per year [Ref. 15].
F-14 Engine Driven Hydraulic Pump, Contract between
USN (ASO) and Abex Corporation
This six year/387,000 operating hour contract was
negotiated in 1973 and covered 258 units at a cost of
$1016 per unit per year. It was significant for several
reasons. Although ABEX had considerable field experiences
with hydraulic pumps this pump was larger and represented
a new state of the art design. The contract is the broadest
warranty under RIW to date in that ABEX agreed to repair
all pumps returned to them with no exclusions. It incor-
porated a pool arrangement in which the contractor kept a
supply of ready to issue pumps on hand in order to meet a
24 hour turnaround time from notification of a failure until
a replacement pump was sent from the factory. The contract
price was based on an expected MTBF of 500 hours during the
first year growing to 750 hours in the last year [Ref. 25]
.
APN 194 Radar Altimeter, Contract between USN and
Honeywell Corporation
The initial procurement contract awarded to Honeywell
for the APN-194 contained an RIW clause. The period of
coverage under this contract was for two years or 1500 hours
per unit and the cost of the warranty has been estimated to
be about 7% of the purchase price. The APN-194 was a new
radar altimeter intended to replace the APN-141 which was
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experiencing a 50 hour MTBF. Although this contract had an
RIW clause it was basically a maintenance service contract
since it covered a short time period (2 years) and the cost
of ECP's was jointly shared by Honeywell and the Navy.
ASO has recently negotiated with Honeywell to provide
a long term (5 year) RIW contract for the APN-194. The
current MTBF of the unit is estimated to be about 465 hours.
Under the RIW this MTBF is projected to grow to over 1040
hours at the end of the five year period [Ref. 26].
AN/ARK- 118 Tacan^ Contract between USAF and Rockwell
Collins Radio
This contract was signed in July 1975 and was the out-
come of a design to cost competition between Collins and
General Dynamics/Electronics. The winning Collins bid was
$9,400 per tacan, with an additional $500 per year per set
for a period of five years under RIW. The initial contract
calls for the coverage of 1000 units, with additional
multi year options of 7,300 units. The tacan is a state -
of art improvement over existing tacan sets. The RIW —
agreement contains a MTBF guarantee of 500 hours for the
first twelve months, 625 hours for months 13-24 and 800
hours for months 2 5-48. If the field MTBF falls below these
levels Collins is required to supply additional spares to
the Air Force with no charge as well as making design




AN/ARN 123 VOR - Contract between USA and Bendix
Bendix won this competitive procurement for 1,139 VOR
sets over four other bidders and signed the contract in
1975. The contract covers a four year period and like the
Air Force tacan contract includes a MTBF guarantee. The
VOR set is required to demonstrate a field MTBF of 500 hours
for the first year, rising to 600 hours during the second
year and 700 hours for the third year. If these values are
not met Bendix must determine the cause, take corrective
action, and conduct additional environmental testing at
no charge [Ref . 16] . The ARN 123 is a standard commercial
unit that has been in use in the civilian environment for
several years, however, this is the first military applica-
tion. Even with the MTBF guarantee the unit per year cost
of the RIW is only 2.7% of the purchase price, the lowest
percentage price for any military RIW agreement. This low
figure is representative of the high confidence Bendix has
in the unit which has exhibited a MTBF of greater than 1000
hours in the civilian environment [Ref. 22].
F-16 Components, Contract between USAF and General Dynamics
The most ambitious RIW proposal to data is currently
under negotiation. The contract could call for RIW coverage
for up to twelve critical subsystems which have been defined
as contol first line units (FLUs) . The contract could apply
any of three different concepts. RIW with a provision for
turnaround time, RIW with a MTBF guarantee, and a comparison
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between Target Logistic Cost and measured Logistic Support
Cost. Under the latter concept the actual logistic support
cost will be computed based on data accumulated during a
verification test of 3500 flight hours. The test will
commence six months after the first F-16 squadron becomes
operational. If the measured value does not exceed the target
value, the contractor is eligible for an award fee. If the
total measured value exceeds the total target value by greater
than 25% the contractor must initiate a correction of
deficiencies (COD)
.
Under the RIW option, the warranty period is 4 8 months
or 300,000 flight hours, whichever comes first and the Air
Force reserves the option to extend the contract in incre-
ments of 24 months or equivalent flying hours. The contract
specifies a maximum of twenty two days between contractor
receipt of a failed FLU and placement of the repaired item
in a secure storage area. The contractor must provide
extra spares if the turnaround time is exceeded.
The RIW with a MTBF guarantee option provides for four
penalties if the computed MTBF for a given measurement period
is less than the guarantee value for that period. The
contractor is obligated to:
1. Perform engineering analysis to identify the cause
of noncompliance.
2. Initiate corrective ECPs.




4. Provide additional spares on a loan basis until
guaranteed MTBF's are met.
Both RIW options are under Separate Firmed Fixed Price
proposals while the LSC option is on a Cost Plus Incentive
fee basis [Ref. 24].
B. SHORT TERM CONTRACTS
Several other contracts have included RIW provisions
(Table 4) , however, these are basically maintenance service
type contracts for short time periods (2 6 months or less)
.
The short time period of these contracts does not provide
any incentive for the contractor to initiate any but the
least expensive ECP ' s since the number of repairs he would
reduce by initiating an ECP would not offset the cost of
the ECP. These contracts, therefore, do not have an incen-
tive for the contractor to improve reliability during the
warranty period and are not RIW's in the strict sense.
They do offer insurance to the government, however, in that
the contractor would lose money on the cost of repairs if
the number of actual repairs exceeded the number that was
used in pricing the warranty agreement. The contractor
therefore has a strong incentive to provide equipment that
has an initially high reliability. Another advantage to
the government is knowing that repair costs for the
warranty period are fixed.
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C. TYPES OF EQUIPMENT WARRANTED
Of the eight long term (greater than 4 years) RIW con-
tracts now in force or under negotiation three are overhaul
contracts , one is an additional procurement of existing
military equipment, one is a new military application of
commercial equipment, two are applied to equipment that is
a state of the art improvement over existing equipment, and
one (F-16) covers units ranging from new procurements of
existing equipment to state of the art equipment improvements
(Table 5). Of the five short term contracts, three were for
additional procurements of existing equipment, one for an
equipment that was a state of the art improvement over
existing equipment, and one a new military application of
commercial equipment.
VJhen the contracts are identified by the military service
(Table 6) , it is clear that the Navy has applied RIW pri-
marily to overhaul contracts for long term RIW, while the
Air Force has used the concept for production contracts.
The Navy procurement contracts that have used RIW are pri-
marily for a short term period (<26 months) , except for the
ABEX contract, and are basically maintenance service con-
tracts.' The lone Army application was a procurement of an
"off the shelf" commercial item.
D. EXCLUSION CLAUSES
The basic exclusion clause in most RIW contracts to
date has included exclusions for:
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Table 5. Types of Equipment Warranted
Long Term (>4 years]
RIW Contracts
Short Term (<26 months)
Contracts Containing
RIW Provisions




































Table 6. Service Use of Warranties
Long Term (>4 years) Short Term (<26 iroits)
RIW Contracts Contracts Containing
RIW Provisiois
USN USAF USA USN USAF USA
New "state of ^ .^ H*
art" for new
use
"State of Art" F-14 AN/AF!N — APN-194 -
Irtprovenent Hydraulic 118 Radar*
over similar Puiit) Tacan Alti.meter
equipnent F-16 (1st
Ccmponents contract)
New F-16 AtJ/AEN - INS -
application ccirpon- 123 VOR Carousel




New A24G-27 APN 154 -
ProcuTfcauent Gyiu Radcu:




























6. damage caused by mishandling, improper
installation, improper operation, and accident
7. broken seal on unit.
The lone exception to these types of exclusions is the
contract covering the ABEX hydraulic pump for the F-14
aircraft which contains the clause:
"In the event a warranted unit is lost or
destroyed, an additional government owned unit
will be introduced into the warranty population
and will assume the unexpired warranty of the
unit lost or destroyed at no increase in contract
price. If such replacement is not possible (e.g.,
because all existing units are covered by similar
warranty) the U.S. Navy may elect to procure a
replacement unit or the parties hereunder may
negotiate an appropriate extension of the
calendar limitations." [Ref. 14]
The number of items that would normally fall under these
exclusions, however, are limited and will generally not
have a large impact on the number of returns the contractor
must process and repair.
A major item that can effect contractor costs under RIW
is the return of units that "test good." A large number
of these unverified failures significantly raise costs to
the contractor since he must test and process all units
returned to him. If the contract contains an MTBF guarantee.
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the contractor is also penalized if unverified failures are
included in calculating the field MTBF of the equipment.
RIW contracts, with the exception of those including a
MTBF guarantee, have not included special provisions for
unverified failures. The number of unverified failures for
the equipment that have occurred in the past (if field
data is available) or an estimate of the number of unveri-
fied failures is usually used in calculating the price of
the RIW. The government indirectly pays this price when
it purchases the RIW. This provides the contractor the
opportunity to increase his profit if he can lower the rate
of unverified failure returns. Contracts containing a
MTBF guarantee have excluded unverified failures from the
MTBF calculation and have, in two of four cases, contained
a provision to pay a fixed fee per unit if unverified
failures exceeded a specified rate. The use of exclusions
is summarized in Table 7.
E. MTBF GUARANTEES AND PENALTIES
Two RIW contracts containing MTBF guarantees have
recently been signed. One by the Army for procurement of
An/ARN-123 VOR navigational equipment and one by the Air
Force for procurement of a new generation Tacan set.
Additionally the proposed contract for the F-16 fighter has
an MTBF guarantee option to cover up to 12 control FLU's.
An earlier procurement of inertial navigational equipment
by the Air Force also contained a MTBF guarantee. The
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government will reirnbiirse contractor $100 for every unverified
failure over 30%.
NETBF guarantee - unverified failures not coimted.
MTBF guarantee option unverified failures not counted.
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guaranteed MTBF values and associated penalties to be
evoked if the specified values are not met are summarized
in Table 8. The penalty clauses used are virtually identi-
cal. They provide for identification of the cause of
failures, corrective no cost ECP's, and providing additional
spares until stated MTBF's are met.
Under a straight RIW the contractor has the option of
improving the reliability of the equipment or of repairing
more units if the reliability is not improved. The latter
choice may be more cost effective to him especially during
the later stages of the warranty period. The MTBF guarantee
removes this option by evoking a heavy penalty by use of
the provision for providing additional spares at no cost
to the government. From a contractor's standpoint, therefore,
there is a high degree of monetary risk involved in a
contract containing a MTBF guarantee than in a straight
RIW for the same equipment.
F. TURNAROUND TIME PROVISIONS
Turnaround time is important to the government since
it has a direct impact on the availability of the equipment
in the fleet. If MTBF is constant and turnaround time
increases, the field availability will decrease due to spares -
not being in stock. Availability can be increased by an
increase in the amount of spares available, however, this
is achieved at the expense of buying additional spares.
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Table 8. MTBF Guarantees and Penalties
Item Guaranteed MTBF
(hours)
AN/ARN-123 VDR 1st year - 500
2nd year - 600


























1-12 months - 500
13-24 months - 625
25-48 months - 800
(1)
Penalty
Engineering analysis to determine
cause, corrective ECP's,
additional environmental testing
Si:ipply additional spares at no
cost determine cause corrective
ECP's
RIW/NETBF Guarantee option
185 Engineering analysis to determine
284 causes, corrective ECP's, provide




1-12 months - 162
13-24 months - 242
25-48 months - 260
1-12 months - 155
13-24 months - 228
25-48 months - 244
1-12 months - 170
13-24 nonths - 212
25-48 months - 224
1-12 months - 210
13-24 months - 330
25-48 months - 350
1-12 months - 415
13-24 months - 600
25-48 months - 640
1-12 months - 325
13-24 months - 470
25-48 months - 500
1-12 months - 155
13-24 months - 228
25-48 months - 244
INS Carousel IV After 6 months - 1100 Inprove system until MTBF value
met, provide additional spares
at 1/2 cost
CD The MIEF guarantee is net if field MTBF meets or exceeds specified




Specified contractor turnaround times and associated
penalties are listed in Table 9. Turnaround times range
from 24 hours for the F-14 hydraulic pump to a high of 6
days for the ARN 99V J^ Receiver. The extremely short
turnaround time for the F-14 hydraulic pump is made possible
by designating 25 of the 258 pumps procured as rotatable
pool items that are kept "on the shelf" at the contractor's
plant. Penalties associated with not meeting specified
turnaround time fall into three categories; warranty exten-
sion, monetary penalty, or provision of additional spares.
The warranty extension is probably the least effective
penalty and causes additional detailed bookkeeping, while
the provision for additional spares is the most effective
since this helps to offset the lowered field availability
caused by the increased turnaround time.
G. COST OF RIW
The cost of a RIW is frequently stated as a percentage
derived from dividing the yearly warranty cost per unit by
the original unit procurement cost. This method does not
take into account differences in the terms and conditions of
the individual warranties, which can effect the cost of the
RIW. It does, however, offer a simple method of comparing
the cost of RIW contracts. It also presents a guideline
evaluating the cost of similar warranty provisions and
establishing a price range. The cost of each RIW contract
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F-14 Hudraulic punip 24 hr. warranty extended 2









M/ARN 118 Tacan 20 days $25 per day for each
day over 20




F-16 cariponents 22 days contractor provides
additional spares
at no cost if not net
APN 194 Racial t 45 days .5% of purchase price
per day over 45












.5% of purchase price
per day over 45
extension of warranty
period if not met
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should be determined by an extensive economic analysis which
evaluates the potential savings to the government and also
takes into account the potential for reliability improvement.
Table 10 documents available RIW cost figures. From
the data presented it appears that the cost of RIW has been
decreasing with time, possibly because of more familiarity
with the concept. It also appears as if the Navy has generally
paid a higher percentage price for RIW than have the other
services but this may be due to the reasons stated above.
In general competitive contracts appear to have been
less costly. Of the nine contracts for which data was ob-
tained five have been or are competitive. The average per-
centage cost for these contracts is about 6%. The cost of
the four sole source contracts is ±iout 17%. The Navy has
negotiated all four of the sole source contracts and one
competitive contract. While all Air Force and Army contracts
have been competitive.
H. MTBF IMPROVEMENT
All RIW contracts for which data is available have re-
sulted in reliability growth or improvement over replaced
systems, expressed as an increase of MTBF. The increases
have ranged from 30% to almost 200%, Table 11. Under the
long term RIW contracts the contractors have used no cost
ECP's to effect the increase in reliability for the AJB-3
gyro and the A24G-27 gyro. Although ABEX has originated 7
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A2 4G-2 7 gyro
MTBF improved from 400 hrs to 52 hrs
no date
Replaced APN 141 which had MTBF of
5 hrs. MTBF achieved 450 hour
7 no cost ECP's originated, not
sufficient data for evaluation of
reliability improvement
MTBF over 1200 hours for warranted





MTBF commercial unit was 1100 hrs
MTBF of USAF unit was 2208 hrs
No data yet, commercial unit has
MTBF 1000 hrs. MTBF guarantee
value - 700 hrs
Replaces AN/ARN-21/52/65/72 with MTBF '
s
hour
MTBF guarantee value - 800 hrs
APN 154 Radar Beacon MTBF improved from 534 hrs to 202 5 hrs
APN 194 Rad Alt
(2nd contract)
Honeywell proposes to increase
MTBF from 480 - 1110 hrs
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is available to determine reliability improvement. The
dramatic increases in the MTBF's of the INS Carousel IV
and the APN 154 Radar Beacon, both short term contracts,
were the result of changes incorporated in the production
of the units rather than any changes made in the units
after they were deployed.
I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTRACTOR RISK AND RIW PRICE
If new equipment, with no field failure data, provides
the greatest monetary risk for the contractor, this risk
should be reflected in the RIW price and in the contract
exclusions. Data for the eight long term RIW contracts does
not substantiate this assumption. The two most expensive
(calculated on a percentage basis) RIW contracts have been
for overhaul contracts where extensive field failure and
repair cost data was available. The broadest warranty to
date, for the F-14 hydraulic pump had a high percentage
cost but also had the shortest turnaround period. The use
of a MTBF guarantee in the AN/ARN 118 Tacan and AN/ARN 123
VOR contracts did not appear to raise the cost of these
warranties to a high level. The F-16 proposal shows that
using an MTBF guarantee would raise the price of the warranty
by 12% to 9 3% depending on the component warranted which
indicates that a MTBF guarantee is more costly than a
straight RIW. Warranty contracts for the "riskier" equipment
also contain m.ore penalty provisions with regard to































































































Although pricing data concerning the short term RIW
contracts (Table 13) is lacking, there seem to be no par-
ticular differences in exclusions or penalties between the
"high" and "low" risk equipment.
J. COMPETITION
RIW contracts that have been competitive have been
negotiated for a lower percentage cost than those that have
been the result of a sole source negotiation. Of the nine
contracts for which data was obtained four have been sole
source and five have been competitive. The average percen-
tage price of a sole source contract has been over 17%
while the average percentage price of a competitive contract
has been 5.8%, Table 14. The Navy has been the only service
to apply sole source RIV7 contracts, it has also payed a
higher percentage cost for warranties.
K. TRENDS IN RIW CONTRACTING
The DDR&E and OSD(I&L) memo of August 1974 establishing
guidelines for RIW seems to have stimulated the use of RIW
(Table 15) . All RIW contracts since 1974 have been for long
(4 years or greater) time periods. The Air Force, in par-
ticular, has attempted to apply the technique to new procure-
ments. The contracts for the ARN-118 Tacan and the proposed
contract for F-16 components are applications which offer
the maximum benefits to the government. The F-16 contract
is the most significant potential application of RIW to
date. The avionic subsystems covered by a RIW option
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Table 14: Competitive - Sole Source
Contracts by Service



























A24G-27 Gyro 7.3% Competitive USAF
F-16 Components 4-10% (RIW) Competitive USAF
AN/ARN 118 Tacan 4.8% Competitive USAF










1967 AJB-3 Gyro 5 yr overhaul USN
1969 A24G-27 O/TO 5 yr New Procuironent
existing equipment
USAF










































AFN 123 VDB/ 4 yr new pixxjurenent USA
conmercial ecjuipment
1976 AHI-194 Radalt Syr overhaul USN
F-16 cfirponents
(proposed)
^2) 4yr new pirocurement
mix of systems
USAF
(1) Includes MTBF guarantee
(2) Includes RIW option and RIW/MTBF guarantee option
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represent the major cost-maintenance items in the program.
This is also the first attempt to warrant complete sub-
systems as previous warranties have covered individual
"black boxes" only. The Army's first attempt at applying
the RIW concept, the AN/ARN 123 VOR/ILS is a middle of the
road approach. The Bendix VOR is a standard commercial
item that has been widely used in civilian aviation and has
demonstrated a MTBF in excess of 100 hours in that environ-
ment [Ref . 22] , Meeting the guaranteed MTBF value of 700
hours after three years does not appear to present much
risk to the contractor as represented by the low (2.7%)
annual maintenance cost. The contract does provide insurance
to the Army, however. Whether this is cost effective remains
to be determined. Of the three services, the Navy seems to
have taken the least risky approach to RIW contracting.
Although the RIW for the F-14 hydraulic pump was an ambi-
tious contract representing a state of art improvement over
existing hydraulic pumps the majority of the Navy's long
term RIW contracts have applied to the overhaul of existing
equipment. Although the F-18 and LAMPS programs are con-
sidering the use of RIW both proposals have left it to the
contractor to determine RIW candidates [Ref, 22],
L. COST EFFECTIVENESS OF RIW
To date only one completed RIW contract (the 1967 USN
contract with LSI for maintenance of 800 gyroscopes) has
provided comprehensive data concerning cost effectiveness.
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During the initial economic analysis LSI projected a
$780,000 cost savings for the Navy over the five year
warranty period. This savings was based on reducing the
maintenance cost of the warranted gyroscopes by 65C an hour.
A total of 1.2 million operating hours was predicted over the
warranty period [Ref . 26] . The cost savings were to accrue due
to a 30% increase in MTBF over the five year period. LSI
calculated that the cost per operating hour under RIW would
be $2.79 which amounted to a $3.35 million fixed cost for the
contract. The operating cost for unwarranted gyroscopes
was $3.44 per hour or $4.13 million. The difference between
the two figures ($4.13 - $3.35 million) represented the
potential savings to the Navy. The minimum cost of the
contract, was based on inducting 800 new configuration
gyroscopes. In actuality a mixture of old and new units
were inducted raising the contract cost to $3,766 million.
The contract, as mentioned previously, was at fixed
cost and based on a total of 1.2 million operating hours.
During the five year warranty period the Navy achieved
only 85 percent of this operating hour total which had the
effect of raising the operating cost per hour. Operating
hours were less than projected due to a decrease in actual
flight hours and a difference between the projected ground
to air ratio (1.63) and the actual ratio experienced (1.47).
Based on the reduced operating hour figure the Navy only
broke even under this contract [Ref. 26]. A potentially
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large savings may accrue to the Navy in the future because
of the increase in reliability of the warranted gyros.
These savings will be in the form of reduced repair costs
and a reduction in the number of space gyroscopes required
to support the installed units, however, actual data to




Since the majority of long term RIW contracts have not
completed their warranty periods , final evaluation data is
lacking. Questions concerning cost savings to the government
and profits to industry must wait for this data before they
can be answered. Nevertheless, several conclusions can be
drawn from the data that is available. RIW contracts have
been used in the procurement of new equipment that has
incorporated state of the art improvements over the old
equipment that it was replacing as well as to overhaul
contracts that have sought to improve the reliability of
equipment already in the field.
The DDR&E and OSD(I&L) memorandum of 1974 urging the
trial use of RIW seems to have achieved this objective.
The Air Force, in particular, has negotiated an ambitious
warranty contract for the AN/ARN-118 Tacan and is attempting
to apply RIW in the procurement of the F-16 fighter. The
Army has recently entered into a long term RIW contract for
the procurement of new navigation equipment. The Navy's
recent contract for the APN-194 Radar Altimeter represents
a more conservative contract, however, the Requests for
Proposals for the F-18 fighter and the LAMP.'s contain RIW
provisions.
In all cases for which data is available the inclusion
of a RIW provision in a contract has resulted in MTBF
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improvement. The question of cost effectiveness, however,
remains unanswered. The first Navy-LSI overhaul contract
for the AJB-3 gyro resulted in a 30% increase in MTBF and a
reduction in maintenance cost of 20% per unit. The Navy,
however, did not realize the potential cost savings from the
contract because of a decrease in operating hours which
resulted in fewer failures and fewer repairs. Data from
other contracts is lacking.
Several short term, 26 month or less, contracts that
contained RIW clauses, have resulted in large MTBF improve-
ments. Since these contracts are basically maintenance
service contracts in that the short term of the warranty
does not make no cost ECP * s cost effective for the contractor,
the large improvement in MTBF came from improvements incor-
porated in the equipment during design and production. The
contractor was given the incentive to make these improvements
since he could raise his profits by lowering the number of
repairs he would make during the warranty period. By
placing a larger emphasis on reliability and strictly en-
forcing reliability design specifications the same results
could be obtained without the use of a RIW provision.
Such an approach might prove less cumbersome and be more
cost effective.
One major advantage of RIW is that it provides the
contractor with timely and accurate data concerning the
reliability of his equipment under field conditions. This
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enables him to isolate the weak points in his equipment
and correct them. This will also help him in any follow-
on designs since he gets first hand experience with the
operating environment. Another approach that provides this
type of information is comparison of Target Logistic Support
Cost to Measured Logistic Support Cost, one of the options
in the F-16 contract. The total cost of this option is
less than 50% the cost of the RIW option and less than 30%
of the RIW with MTBF guarantee option. Although this option
does not provide the contractor with an incentive to improve
reliability over a long term period, it does provide for
an incentive to keep logistic support costs low which
translates to a high initial reliability.
Since all RIW contracts are for a specified operating
hour or calendar time period the maximum cost savings to
the government occur only when this operating time is
achieved. An actual utilization rate below that projected
will, at some point, make the RIW more expensive than
organic maintenance.
In using RIW, the reliability of the entire weapons
system must therefore be considered. In some cases, par-
ticularly with new weapons systems, it may be more advan-
tageous to cover a wide variety of systems under RIW to
insure an overall high reliability. An example of this
type of application is the proposed F-16 application.
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
INSTALLATIONS ANO LOGISTICS 14 August 1974
MEMORANDUII FOR The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations
and Logistics)
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations
and Logistics)
The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations
and Logistics)
The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and
Development)
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and
Development)
The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research
and Development)
SUBJECT: Trial Use of Reliability Improvement Warranties in the
Acquisition Process of Electronic Systems/Equipments -
ACTION MEMORANDUM
Reference: (a) ASD(I&L) Memo to Secretaries of the Military Departments
dated 17 August 1973: Subject: Trial Use of Warranties, etc,
As part of the Department of Defense's efforts to reduce costs and improve
operational reliability of electronic systems and equipments, reference (a)
requested that a trial application of warranties (now called Reliability
Improvement Warranties (RIW) ) be utilized in the acquisition process to
help determine the scope. and benefits that RIWs may have for the DoD.
The objective of a RIW is to motivate and provide an incentive to contrac-
tors to design and produce equipment which will have low failure rates and
low repair costs during field/operational use. This rechnique attempts,
through the use of contracting agreements (which extend for several years
after Government acceptance of the equipment) to provide an incentive
repair costs in order to maximize their profits. Thus, the intent of the
RIW contracting technique is to realize improved operational reliability
and maintainability of DoD systems and equipments for each additional
dollar that the contractor uses. For these reasons, a RIW is not a main-





Afl a result of reference (a), a Reliability Improvement Warr.anty Committee
was established to prepare a definite OSD policy with regard to the
application of RIWs in the procurement process. The committee nnennber-
flhip includes representatives from the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Installations and L.oi;istics), the Office of the Director,- Defense
Research and Engineering and the Military Departments. Valuable inputs
have been provided by each conimittec member plus contributions by
representatives from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) and the Office of tlic General Counsel. Mr. Donald F.
Spencer from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Logistics) has functioned as the Chairman of the Committee. The
conimittce completed the RI'^7 Gl' id-jl' nes on li July 1974. Included in
the Guidelines are a RIV/_deiLut lOii and sjiope, tne RIV/ appUcation criteria,
the special funding requir e_i^nerus , the essential elements in a RIW contract
clause, th_e RIW evaluation_appr_oach, and the potential benefit's which. may
result from the use of a RIW. Thus, Jth_e Guidelines,
_
enclosed hereto^
arc available for immediate use on a tri;il basis and should aid in determin-
ing whether potential cccnumic and reliability benefits do, in fact, result.
Therefore, the Military Departments arc now requested to undertake a
tTial_usc of RIV/s in a nuixiber of electronic systenn/equipment programs.
These prograitis should be identified and their planned intended use of a
RI'.V reported to Lhc Officn of l.'ic As-^istant Secretary of Defense (llnL.)
"WI (Attn: Mr. Donald f". Spencer) which will continue to function as the
OSD coordinator for RIV,' activiiy.
I
>
To realize the maximum potential from the use of RIWs, it is important
not only to identify tlie i;ood ri'suits but also to identify the problemt areas
80 that the latter can be factored in and corrected in the Guidelines.
Particular attention sh'^'-Ui hi- given to the collection of data so that
accurate evaluation can 't::c. crv;5Je of each program. It i3 requested that
quarterly status reporti ^^ iutmiittcd on the candidate systems.

KELiAP.iLTTY JM }'^POvr:>.i r:\T v.-Ar:RAN:TY guidelines
DEFINITION AND SCOPE
One of the most significant items of continuing concern to the Department
of Defense is tlic need for improved reliability and maintainability— ^^ '^^^
v/eapon systems' equipment.
A contractual technique used in the commercial environment and currently
being utilized on a trial basis within the DoD as a means of implementing
sucli improvements is the Reliability Improvement Warranty, or RR'/ (also
previously Icncv^n as a "Failure Free" or "StaJidard" Warranty). The
objective of a RIW is to niotivate and provide an incentive to conti- actors to
desij^n and produce eqviiprnent winch will have a low failure rate as well as
lov.' repair costs, after failure due to field/operational use. Furthermore,
tliis technique attempts, through the use of contractual agreements (v.'h--re ib.K.
period ox ^crfoiiTiance extends ovei' several years), to provide an inccnlive
for contractors to iinprove t!:e reliability of their equipment and to reduce
repair costs during the period of warranty coverage in order to n":a::imize
their profits.
It should be noted that a RIV/ is not a maintenajicc contract and docs not
require that tl^ie contractor provide routine periodic upkeep, regulations,
adjusting, cleaning or ether normc."! upkeep. A RIW also docs not cover
• :« ?
1_/ "l/i aintaicpbi] iry'' refers to a desigii feature of a sy stein," subsypte:-n.
cquipiTicnt or cor:^.pc>nont which coiinotcs ti-.at the itein is fv.b t-ct lu
biMiip ripaii" d ajif- rj)a;niai;!.jcl ir. an ostaV.il islicd envirn;:inc.il., -j.r.dnr
defined IV. :•.•.•.:. .' c ( r.ri] ii;iM.'; . a:'.d 'Aiii'.in i^*-! li:;Tc a/u! co.^t r •-• t r :.i:".'
=
n•Jf•'l^ (1 lo : .. .j1 e:"i;;:)] ; -!\cfi )••;) ; aV)iI i ly r rq ':; r.'i:;cnt s . '''l\i::\r\-\\:.: ' A] '.'.y
i]'.'---j !'.'i I. ri!u- :r. ••.ii:l'-n.MiCi: or ro]>;:irr., b'.;t rr.tl.t.-r, t!".*- c:i- •vitl-
V. ..»«." 11 I . , .
. y ; ' ^ y "j .' i.c v' w; . i J, i .. ..t, o .
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coniponcnts oj" a warranted ilen^ which arc expected to need replaccn-jcnt
midcr normal use daring the tcrni of the warrajity (such as filters, light
bulbs, etc). Such items nnay be provided for by separate provisions in
the contract consistent witli current laws and regulations, but they shall
not be included in the RIV/ provision. In general, a RIW will provide for
the repair or replacement of failed units as well as agreed to no cost
engineering changes and the calibration, adjustment and testing associated
tlierewitli.
The Arjned Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) states that a
v/arranty clause gives the Government a contractual riglit to assert
claiiTic regarding the deficiency of supplies or services furnislied, not-
v/it-Iislanding any other contractual provisions pertaining to acceptance by
the GovcrniTient. Such a clause cillows the Govcrjim'.int addilior.al tiiric after
acceptance of these supplies or services in wliich to assert a right to
corrcctio.M of the dp.ficiencies or defects, r e-perforrnajice, an equitable






period of lime niz.y begin at the time of delivery, or at the occurrence of
»'
'
[ . a specified event, ai:d may run for a given number of days or months or
until occurrence of another specified cvci:t. TJic intent of such a clause
is "buyer protection"' fr oni non- conforriing niatcri?.ls or poor workr.:ansiiip.
V The RIW goes beyond tills conventional concept of warranty. - * -. •
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The essence of the RIV' phno?;cphy is that during the period cf the
warranty coverage, for a fixed price, contractors will be encouraged
to Improve the reliability and to reduce the repair costs of the equipment
through the mechanism of "no-cost" (to the Government) Engineering Change
Proposals (ECPs). These ECPs shall be consistent with Government
procedures to preserve Configuration Control. Cnce a fixed price is
established for the warranty, the actual profit realized by the contractor
is dependent upon the equipment's reliability and maintainability in service
use, plus ajiy improvements that he can ir.al;e in its reliability and main-
tainability so as to keep the number and cost of repairs as low as possible.
A RIW results in the contractor focusing his attention on his reliability
and maintainability efforts, since through such a program he car* obtain
greater profit. Thus, a RIW becomes a contracting technique by which
the Government derives the benefits of improved reliability and main-
tainability for each additional dollar that the contractor earns. The above
features tlierefore distinguish a RIW from the conventional warranties
described in ASPK.
The RIW concept iTiay be inlrodvired at a-ny pc<int during the acquisition
cycle. Normally, the m?ximuni benefit can be expected by including such
a RIW contract provision at thr time of award of the initial production
contracl for the system/, quipnicnt. For new C'juipmcnt, it will.generally





early in the dovelopnicnt cycle that it plans to consider such z. Ue.rra.nty




By so doing, contractors will be motivated to ensure that their
equipment's reliability and maintainability are given appropriate attention
at the time it is initially designed, since this could affect its subsequent
•repair or replacement costs.
The greatest value of a KIW contract provision is expected to be realized
in the initial years of the equipment's field deployment. Thus, after the
equipment's reliability and maintaij^ability have been satisfactorily dennonstrated
tVirough field use, the Government .niay then assess the cost effectiveness of the
RIW to determine whether to continue or to eliminate such warranty coverage.
It should be emphasized that the terms and commitments required of the
contractor, particularly for the initial warranty, should result in a reasonable
balance between his risks and the degree of incentive needed to achieve the
primary goal of system availability. The size and scope of the initial commitmer.
should be determined in consideration vi the uncertainities in future support
costs and the risks involved to both contractor and governnient. This period
of warranty coverage generally will continue for at least three years. i
P£:LIABILITY LMPBOVEMENT warranty (RIW)
A Reliability Jniprovcment "Wnrranty is defined as a provision in either






(a) the^ contractor is provided with a monetary incentive, throughout
the period of the warranty, to improve the production design and engineering
of the equipnicnt so as to enhance the field/operational reliability and main-
tainability of the system/equipment; and
(b) the contractor agrees that, during a specified or measured period
of use, he will repair or replace (within a specified turnaround time) all
equipnient that fails, (subject to specified exclusions if applicable).
A fixed price for the RIW coverage should be agreed upon during ncgotialio;
of the acquisition contract or equipment overhaul contract. The v/arranty
should idso bo cstablislicd as a separate contract line item. In the case
of foriiially advertised contracts, the terms of tiie warranty and a separately
priced contract line item must be ])rovided for in the Invitalion for Bids.
RELIABILITY !>.• P:;OV EM ENT \VAPs3L-\XTY (TAV:) APPLICATION C};1TEK:a
Decisio.'is for RJV.'' application chould be inade as early as possible in llie
acquisition cycle. The contractor should be informed early in the design
phase that there will be warranty r cquirenicnts so that he can naakc iniportani
trade-offs. It is noted that the equipment need not meet all the criteria sh.o\'.r
below in order to apply a Rn\L Rather, at this poiiit in time the Coven, nient
should pick logical candidates which meet several or n"iany of the criteria
so tliat further rssessinent can bo made of the value of tliis tcclinioiic.
Tlie following criteria may be used for .'^electing equipment :.':. poienticl
candidates for Pcliability Impro\cmenv Wai-rax-.ty coverage. There criteria
may be r.scd ;'o)- systems, sr.h'-.y stents
,
units, s*.: I)'.:ijil 3 , oj- cv.-n n.oc! Ac::.
a. A v.rrrrnty c:,;-) h<- < btin;n ri al a price r om:Tn;i.'^ i r ale •' '.




«b. Moderate to high initial support costs are iuvolved,
c. The equipment is readily transportable to j>ermit return to the
vendor's plant or, alternatively, -the equipment is one for which a contractor
can provide for field service.
d. The equipment is generally self-contained, is generally immune
from failures induced by outside units, and has readily identifiable failure
characteristics.
e. The c:^-i j,.r.ent application in terms of expected operating time and
the use environment are known.
f. The equipment is succcptiblc to being contracted for on a fixed
price type basis.
g. The contract can be structured to provide a warranty period of
several years. This should allow the contractor sufficient time to identify
and analyse failures in order to permit reliability and maintainability
improvements.
h. The equipment has a potential for both reliability growth and
reduction in repair costs.
i. 'Potential contractors indicate a cooperative attitude toward
acceptance of a RI^V provision and cvalunlion of its effectiveness,
j. A sufficient quantity of the equipment is to be procured to make the
ti 1
RIW cost-effective. .
k. The cqv.ipmcnt is of a ccnfij;;ivrlion that discourages unauthorized
field repair, pj «f rably s,ca]rd a.M'.l capabK* of ». oritainini: an -Elapsod 1 iiii-.
Indicator (ETi) 'T sonio otlv-r mc.in.^ '.r mshj^'i- r tr.rol.

1. There is a reasonable degree of assurance that there will be a
. high utilization of the cquipnicnt.
m. The equipment is one that permits the contractor to effect no-cost
ECPs subsequent to the Government's approval.
n. Failure data and the intended operational use data can be furnished
the contractor for the proposed contractual period and updated periodically
daring the term of the contract.
FUNDING OF RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT WARRANTIES
Ln tlic past, diffeicnt points of view have been expiessed regarding the
funding of Rl\Vs. Lack of clear guidance in this area has caused difficulties
in the use of this contractual technique. In order to provide clarification
^ regarding the types of funds to be used for procurements incorporating a RJV,
the funding policy guicu-lines have bceji authorized for use by OASD
(Comptroller) and Office of Assist.ar;t Gtmcral Cou;is e] (F.M). These funding
guidelines r.hould permit the-more effective utilization of KIV/s.
a. HIV/s shall be funded from the sr.me appropriation as t!ie acquisitio.-:
or overiiaul warranted (i.e., the warranty sJiall bo paid from the procurement,
operation and inaintejiance, or RDT<;E app^-opr iation of tlie service or agency
concerjicd depending on from wliich of the said appropria,tioas the acquisition
oj overhaul is funded). The HIW cost is part of the fixed price contract, i-.na
.payment to the warrantor foi ihe RIW porlion sl^all not be n-iade in a manner
different tb.an payment under the rcmaiiiing portion of tlir: co.ntract, except
that, ptiym.cnt lor the RJ\"/ iiiay be delayed until delivery or r cl inquis IiiV.cr.t of
com to) c f the: item by the w.'i r r an t i>r .
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b. In order to maintain the in^portant distinction between a RIW atnd a
service contract covcrin<; normal, periodic maintenance, the following
requirements must be satisfied:
(i) The RIV/ shall be inclu'ded in a fixed price contract for the
acquisition or overhaul of an item or items.
.
(ii) The warranty period on each item shall begin after manufacture
• or overhaul, upoj:i delivery or rclinquirhrncnt of control of the item by the
warrantor.
(iii) The RIV/ shall require the v.-arrantor to repair or replace the
waj-rantcd item upon failure.
(iv) The RIV/ bhall not include requirements for the warrajitor to
provide normal upl;ecp, cleaning, adjust:n;3, regulatir.g or ether periodic
ii'iaintcnaiicc whicli would be required v.-lthoul. respect to faibn-e.
(v) The JXIW shall exclude coinpon>_uts of the v/arrantcd item \\'h.ich ur,d<^:
normal circumstances will require i eplaceiTient before the expiration of th.c
\varranty (such as filters, light bulbs, etc.). Sucli iteiris ir^ay be jjrovidcd
for by separate provisions in the contract consistent v/ith current laws aiid
1
regulations, but they sliall not be included in the RIV.' provision.
;
I
ESSF:KTL>*vL ELEMENTS IN' RIV/ CLAU5:E - ;
,
j
Because RIW provisions must be tailored to the item selected, a standard ;
KIW clause is not feasible. Mowever, Ihe fojlowijig is a lisi of lliose essential
clen'icnts v,hich normally sliould be considered for inclusion in such a.cjause:
80 ^ -^

I, STATEMENT OF CONTRACT V/ARHANTY
•*
,
a. TERM . State length of time warranty will be In effect. This should
cover usage (operating hours)and/or calendar time {generally three years
or longer).
b. OBJECTIVE /SCOPE : State the primary objective of the warranty,
i. e. , to motivate the contractor to design and produce equipment which is more
reliable and less costly to repair than at present. If there is to be a
specified reliability requirement, this sliould be clearly set forth in the
contract.
c. FAILUPvE; State what constitutes a failure v.-hich will require the
contractor to repair or replace a failed itcni, at his option, at no chaj^ge
,' in contract price.
d. EXC LI] S] 0?\'S : Stale what conditio:.? (e.g. items lo3t or damaged due
to fire, e>:ploi;ion, etc.) and actions associated witli repairs (e.g. packing
shippi/ig, etc.) are specifically e^cludec under the warranty.
e. SM]P3^] ."\ G COSTS: State if contractor or Government pays for expense
of returning failed units to contractor.
i. PRICE: Indicate a separate price for warranty coverage and for the
basic unit procured in order to make it possible to dcterininc the cost to
the Cover nm.cjit of the RlV/. »
II. C ONTR AC TC^x OP. LIGATION """ • •
:
, (
^' V-'AR R. A r^"T Y N 1 .-'v R K n-v' G S . Require contractor to cause p/romincnt displ.
% of pc)- ti.'MM i." [(>;•)!•! alio:", on sinfacc ("f unit, showing that item is v.jirr anted,





b. - TURNABOUND TLNfE: Sute turnaround time required by the contract
^s\d contractual adjustments or other considerations, as appropriate, to be
exacted if the contractor exceeds the number of days so specified. A contract
turr.c.round time should be defined as c] ate. unit |s received by contractor for
repair, to date unit Is repaired and shipped by contractor to Government.
c. RECORDS; Require contractor to maintain records by serial number
for each unit under v/arranty and to make such records available to the Government
upon request,
lU. GOVERNMENT OBLIGATION ;
a. CONT AIN E R
S
: Indicate whether or not the Government will supply special
containers for reshipment of units to and from their destinations for the life of
the warranty.
b. NO-COST MODIFICATIONS : State procedures for submittal of contractor
Initiated no-cost ECPc designed to improve the onit's reliability /maLntainability. .
I
Tho contractor should be advised that such ECPs will be subject to the Government'
approval.
IV. misc'ellaneous
a. C'SPECTION : State the extent of both Government aiid contractor inspectio:
to 1)0 required.
b. DISPOSITION ; State that each unit returned, that is not considered repair-
able, shall be disposed of by the contractor as directed by the Adn^inlstrating
Cudtr acting Officer (ACO). Also, indicate tlic manner of disposition of t!ic unusi-c
po-iion of tho wp.rranty for ^iiy inil si!l>ifrlt:d to an iwcluded failure or t!ic»l, uDon






c. NOT I FlC A^J" ] QN : Indicate, the rcquircni;nt for botli the contractor and
the Govcrnijicnt to notif/ each other, witliin a specified time, of any deficiency
discovered in a unit. ' .
d. . UNYEKIFIl^D FAILURES : State whether or not the contractor will be
compensated for the cost of testing items returned to him under the warranty
lor which no discrepajicy is found.
e. AD J ITSTM FN T S : Lidicate under what circumstances, if any, the Govern,
mejjt is authori:'.cd to make adjustments to units under warranty.
V • DATA REQUIREMENTS




The contractor v^ill be required to establirh and
inaintain a data system capable of j^roviding a repair record of each unit,
analysis of unit failure, number of iieins returned, turnaround ai.d pipeline
time of unit returned, rcinaining wai rarity coverage, etc.
b. GOV ERNM ENT DEV ELOPED ] 3ATA . The Governm-cnt shall be required
to provide in a timely manner, available Governinent generated operation and
maintcjiancc data generated on the equipment.
DET ERMFC ATION OF C C>ST EFFECTIV E>:ESS OF USE OF A RELIABILITY
IN'IPROYEMENT V/.^RRANTY
The benefits to be dcri\cd from use of a RIW provision sJiould be related to
tl^e cost thereof to tlie Governnicnt as well as system rcHability and availability.
In the case of new systc:"nb and equipment entering the Government invciUory




experience with such items for a baseline cost. Therefore, to compute benefits
'^ versus varra-nty cost, in the above instance, may require judgirient on the part
of the Government.
In g^eneral, a cost ax.alysis should be performed for each proposed warranty
application, upon receipt of the contractor's proposal, in order to determine
whether or not use of a RIW would be cost effective. Such an analysis should
Investigate the relative cost of the RIV/ and xion RIW situations (including ECPs)
ajid cxaniine the cost of varying time periods. The use of a RRV provision will
generally involve additioiial costs over the acquisition cost. These costs must
be compared with "in house" Governnient costs to perform repairs and make
equivalent reliability improve nients. .
The decision to accept or reject a RIW provision must, therefore, be
based in part on the support co5;ts the Government would incur if the equipment
were purchased without a RIW. The Government support organization would
havo to provide a cost estimate to do the things that tlie contractor would do
under the RIW.
In order to make an accept /reject decision as to use of a RIW provision,
the actual price proposed by tli'.- contrcictor for the RIV,' must be known. It is
thcrefoic irr.portanl Ihit the contractor be required to -separately price the RIW
pro\'isicn soth^t a comparison can be mnde with the Governnient estiinate.
im :liabj:.ity ].\'.provi:mext WAi<r>AXT Y evaluation appftoach
In cvaluatni^;; th'- cffectiv(r!.css of \.hn RJW approach from a cost and perform.\'-.
viewpoint, it ir, err-i-ntia] thai .ircurato dat-i bo palhcrrd on field reliability and

. utilization plus maintenance actions and that tlic contractor be cooperative in
reporting actions taken under the warranty. Both the Government and the
contractor •tiust establish and maintain a data system capable of providing
information relative to warranted equipment so that a suitable evaluation can be
made. *.
I It would be inost desirable to determine how effective the RIV/ approach
has been when compared with identical or similar equipnient whose repair
was ^ccornplisheel by a Gbvernnient repair facility or by separate contract;
hov.'ever, this may not be possible in many instajices. Thus, when an item
andcr warranty is being produced for the first lime or, v.Jicn there is no
identical or similar non-warrajitcd equipnient available for comparison, it
V^ill be necessary to ccmpute wliat it would have cost the Goveriimcnt repair
facility lo do th.e job if tliere had been jig warranty provision in the contract,
based on the failure rates actually experienced, tiiric to repair, nuinbcr of
spares required, etc. Tins method of comparing estiniatcd Governnicnt repair
facility costs wit!i liie contract price paid for the warranty is one of the few
mctiiods avaiinble to evaluate the relative cost of tlic warranty approach wh.ere
, a. control group is not present.
^
In assessing whellier or not the RIW :jpproach used in a given procurement
has increased reliability, ea'sc of maintenance, and the service life of the
equipnient jro:n both an acquisition and a repair ancl overhaul basis, we must
ensure tliat sufficient usage data is available under the contract to enable a
pi oper ajialyr.is lo be ir.ade. In other words, a sit;nificant portion o*" the conlri-.c'.




trend has been established. This is especially importar.t since there is
a possibility that benefits commensurate with the price paid for the warranty
«
may not materialise because of a'reduction in the use of the equipment under
that contracted for in the warranty provisions.
Factors to consider in evaluating RIW results (pertaining mainly ,to equip-
ment for which we have operational experience) in order to make a determinatio:
c.i tc the scope c.~.t benefits to the Goverr.mer.t due to use of a RIV.' prevision are
as follows:
a. Number of operational units procured.
b. Price of basic unit as well as price paid for warranty coverage.
C. Warranty period in months.
d. Operating hours used per month, as well as total program operating
hours involved.
e. The planning MTBF that the warranty was based upon, as well as the
number of returns planned on during the warranty period.
f. In the case of new equipn"ient buys, the amount of savings estimated in
initial Government support costs by precluding the need for such support iteins
as test and support equipment, training of Governnnent personnel and technical
manuals. However, in determining the savings involved, care should be taker,
that if the Government expects to asisumc support after the warranty expires, •
"start up" costs should be included. ' —
g. Government recurring support costs, such as the cost of warrr.nty




" '^ -- ^-
I

trained in handling and shippini; warranted units so as not to void the
terms of the warranty. Furthermore, the special data requirements
of warranty clauses will also require administrative action.
\i. Number of spare units required due to excessive contractor turn-
around tiirie, and cost thereof to the Government.
i. Comparison of cost of organic repair (processing through Government
depot repair facility) of unwarranted Itcins v^ith repair costs for same
items under warranty.
j. Comparison between contract price for RIW coverage (for the hours oi
operation contracted for under the warranty provisions), witli the repair
expense based on acquiring the same ium^iber of opera.ting hours from an
unwnr r aiited unit.
k. Comparison of Is-ITEF, tuj-naround and pipeline tiinc of the warrantee]
items v/ii.!i that foi- unwarranted similar itenis and the effect thereof on
availability of equip^mient to the Government.
1. The extent to \vl\ich any iinpr ovcment in the MTBF, turna.round and
pipeline time of the warranted cquipincnt may be attributed to tiie RIW
contract pros-is ioiis
.
m. If there is a reduction in the use of the equipment under that contr actf.r'
for in the v/arranty provisions, whether or net this has resulted in benefits
not being coiiimcnsurate with t!ic jjricc paid for warranty coveraj^c.
n. Any rcductio;i in cost associated with rcla::ation of conf igur diion




• A principal motivation for PIW is to provide an incentive for the manu-
facturer to be responsible for the field reliability (ratiier than laboratory
or bench reliability) of his equipment and encourage him to modify the
equipmeiit as needed to achieve reliability improvements.
In the absence of such an incentive the government has traditionally
relied on a number of specifications and standards for configuration
management, quality assurance, reliability denionstration and parts
and fabrication procedures in an attempt to enforce the production of
reliable and n^iaintainable cquii-^rncnt. For eacli procurcmciit for which
a warranty is planned, a review should be made to insure tl^at procedures
and specifications are not applied in such a manner as to increase iniieient
costs or to reduce contr acLoi- oj-portunitics to iiiakr.- cost savingr.
POTE's^TIAJ. BENEFITS rTvOM USF: OF 1^ EL I ABILiTY r.lPl'OVEMZNT
v/ARr;ANr.TES
Many potential benefits to both il;e GoverniT.cnt ana the cc;Ur r.ctor may
result from tl^e use of RIW provisions. Some of these benefits are as
follov.'s:
BENEFITS TO GOVERNMENT
a. Incentives and responsibility for field reliability are assigned to the






b. Greater emphasis is placed on the life cycle cost approach. - -








d. There is an increased incentive for the contractor to introduce
• dcsion/prodviction changes that will increase the MTBF of the equipment
and result in reliability growth.
e. An incentive for reduction in repair costs is provided, since any
reduction in labor hours or materials used in repairing equipment will
increase tlie contractor's profits.
,
f. MiniiTial initial support investnient is required by the Government,
uincc the contractor is to provide repair services during the warranty
period
.
g. PvIW usage niay reduce r cquir ements for skilled inilitary maintenance
and support n'ianpov.'er .
BENEFITS TO COIsTRACTOR
a. Iricrcased profit potential when field MTBF is improved above pricirrj
base.
b. Muhi-year guaranteed busincs.s.
c. The contractor becotTies niore familiar with the operational reliability
and rn.n intainabil ity c!iar acler i sties of liis equipiTient, winch siiould heljj hi:;:i
in obtaining follow-on cojUmctr.
.
CONCI.USION
In conclusion, a Heliabilily Impro\-enicnt Warranty is a procur en^'cnt
approacli v.hich, v.-hen properly applied, can reduce tl;c- Government's life
cycle costs. Inherent in the RRV concept is the contractor's molivatio;-i to
coi:it inuor.sly reduce )-cpair or replacement life c:ycle corts thrc/M^'i rcliab.li'
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effort applied bcyc)nd hardware acceptance. Due to the continuous stress
by tlic contractor on decreasing failure rates, the Government benefits
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INSTALlATIOKS Ar:i) LOij: JT;-S l6 SEP 1975
2\4EMORANDUM FOR Assistant Sccrctt\ries o£ the Milito ry Departments (RicD)
Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments (I5cL)
SUBJECT: Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW) Guidelines
References: (a) ASD(K-iL) Mcmoraiidum to Secretaries c)f tlic Military
Departments, dated 14 August 1974, regarding Reliabiliiy
Improvement A^arranty (RIW) Guidelines,
(b) Councilof Defense ?aid Space Industry Associations
(CODSLA) Letter, dated 18 July 1975, regarding RIW's.
The purpose of this menidrandum is to clarify and expand on DoD's current
RIV/ Guidelines. Your support in continuing to see tliat reliability incen-
tives are properly applied to contracts is essential to reduce support costs
and improve field reliability. This is especially important in liglit of the
recent conce^-ns expressed by industry that RIV/'s inay be inappr opriaf cly
applied so as to pose undue risk on contractors (reference b, enclosure 2,
the issues raised therein v/ill be investigated by a recently formed
tri-Service \/orking group).
We wish to re-emphasize that the principal objective in applying RIW's is
to incentivize contractors to design and produce reliable equipment.
IiTiposition of unreasonable terms and risk on contractors will not serve •
this objective.
The RIW objectives can be best achieved under a fixed price contractual
agreeinent. Otlier incentive approaclies for improving equipment reli-
ability should 'be utilized when application of a RIW would result in undue
risk. A recently establislied "Tri-Service Reliability and Support Incen-
tives Group" v.'ill in the next four jnonths investigate other contract incen-
tive techniques and develop gnaidelines for these concepts. Your support
of this group's efforts is requested.
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Two inajor criteria lor the apijlicatiqn oi R.IV/'s ar.; ihct: {1} L]^e field
reliability, costs to support the; equipment, nud pol : ntfal foj* ri-.l lability
growth will be reasonably predictable at the time tlie lirm fi:>icd price
bid is made,, and (Z) the ternis of tlie RiW be tai.lorc;':! so that tV.c rewards
and risks to botli industry and the governn;eut ar<.-. :•. cccjital^J c. Tiieso
criteria are discussed in enclosure 1.
The above. criteria should be disseminsited as a cla ri.Clc.ation r.nd expan-
sion to the current JIIW gxiidclincs. Procu^-ing af-eiK-.les should be
instructed to apply the two preceding crJtcJ'ia. Fen- each RIW cipplication
an indeper.dent analysis sho\.ild be perfori^-icd to determine Vaiit contractor
bids arc reasonable and that there is a proper balance beUvecn potential
rewards and risks.
Proper application of the above guidelines will contribute to the wider
use of v/arranties on a sound basis.

Al ']'!.,JCATK)\' (.)]' law
M.\JOr. CPaTElUA lor applicaLiun of lllWs are:
.
* t
1. r'ield rclir-bility, costs to support the equipment, nncl potcntinl
for reliability growth will be; rcasoniibly predictable at the cin:ie the firiM
fi>:cd pj'ice bid is n.ade.
2. Terms o'l' tlie RRV be tailored so that tlic rewards yuid rislcs to
botli industry and the government are acceptable.
For RIW application to Ijavc niaxiiriuai affect, contractors should be
told early in deveJopnieut tliat a warranty is antici]:)atcd. It i.s desi:.-aV)lc
to elicit a warrar.Ly quote during the competitive pliase in order to get a
rcasoHcible price. T}:iis raises the problem that the quote may l^e solic;iled
prior to the completion of development testing and with associated
uncertainties. As a general rule, the pric:e quote slioeJd be soliciicd ar.
late in tlic program as possible, under conipetition, and consii,tciit with
the needs for test data associated v/itli each program.
There are a nuniber of criteria whicli should be satisfied for a pro-
grain to be selected for RI\\'' application, examples of wliicli arc cor .^lir.cd
in the current RIW g\iidelines. A major criteria whicla sliould be omphaLiized
is reasonable risk to industry as well as to the government. Sucii is
significantly influenced; (1) by v/hether thr^ equipnicnt is e volutior.a ry , {?-)
by the availability of test data (at the time of bid) o:\ which to base co^t
and reliability estiinates. and (3) by the ability of tlie governnuMit to
provide th:: contractors witli reasonable projections of mission, ejiviron-
iTient, and expected utilization.
Application of RlWs does not have to be limited to procurements that
are merely a repackaging of previously fielded equipment. It ca:i be
applied to any new equipment, even if tlie design utiliiics new tecluiolcgy
and there is lio previous field experience. Wliat is important is that
adeqviate development time and testing be scheduled to support reasonable
cost and reliability estimates at the tiine the firn'i fixed price bid is made.
For any RIW ap}>lication, considerable latitude exists in tailoring tlie
terms and conditions to the uncertainties. For example, the reliability
guarantee can be tailored; turn-around time requirements can be varied;
exclusions can be adjusted to fit the situation; and the mitial con-imitrner.L
can be liniited to the initial production buy. In general, tlie greater the
uncertainties the less stringent would be the warranty terms. In no case,
however, should terms be tailored to such an extent that the RIW o!)jectivi;







Brig/Gen. Dewey K. K. Lowe
Director of Procurement Policy,
DCS/Systems & Logistics, Hq. USAF
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TIMIIU; OK lUW AI'IMJCATIUN
A. Whea Sliould RiV; Ha Api^lied?
In dddressinp, Llie qut;^Liou of "when" RIW should l)e appl i t.d
,
cunsiderat ion
mu^^L at the sair.L! tltiie be jmvcu to "how" it should be .appl iod , and also
to pertinent background .md historical factors relating to reliability,
from the laboratory and field uiia^n vantage points. Fundamentals of
contractor and governm(;nL risk must also be addressed.
o Backg rcHind
Industry is keenly nv/are of, and quite sympathetic with, the USAF
need for improved field reliability and feels that one route to the
achievement of that goal may be a properly applied RIW program. The
current change in emphasis from "performance at almost any cost" to '.^
a desire for a proper balance of performance, unit production cost, '
relia!)ility , maintainab i 1 L L y , and availability is aiso well recognized -^
and applauded. In achievinj', this balanced emphasis on reliability and
lower operating costs the IISAF lias felt the necessity to provide an
early incentive which wilJ help .insure proper emphasis on lov.'ur operal ir.g^^
cost (i.e., reliability and maintainability) during the critical design /
and development period. It is during this period that the greatest
impact on eventual field I'cliability will be realized. The problem of
higli operating cost and associated low availability resulting from por r
field reliability and maintainability is not new.
VJhile it is true that performance has b(;en the overriding factor
in forr.icr year.s, the reli-il) i li ty question was not entirely i[',nored. The
initial ai)proacli \.'as to specify a required MTBF in the procureiuent siicc.
Laboratory tests in a benign environment v;ere carried out to demoniit rate
thai 1 lie specified reli.ability had been achieved. Later an attempt war.
made to simulate the ambicint environment during tliese laboratory test'-., (
and finally, reliability growth testing was instituted during the laborii- .
tory reliability Lest cycle. That tlicse techni(|ue.s did not achieve tlio
desired results in the field is evidenced by tlie chart on page 10. i'his
chart plots the reliability achieved in tlie field against the si)ccific'fl
reliability for ten different tactical radars in as many varic:ties of
aircraft. All of the various previously discussed technic|ues for nv.- ^•- u lug
reliability in the laboratory are represented in this sample. Pre.'-'n' ' ] y
,
tlie laboratory tests approximated the specifications before coinmitrai-n.t':-
to full scale product i.on v.'cr*.; made. It is, thc-.refore, obvious that thono
teclmiques did not solve the real problem of reliability in the field.
There is little doubt that the USAF faces a real problem if a moans
of reversing t li i s trend of low field reliability and resultant li i j'.li
opcratin,", and maintenance cost is not found. According to hig.hly
qualified Dol) sources, fifteen years .igo 50% of the USAF budj'ci: was
expendud on investiueni in new equipment and 50% on 06.M and pay. Tcd-iy,
30/f. is spent on investment and 70% on 06M and pay. Unless tlii.s trc '
is reversed, the consequences to the USAF, industry, and the nat'-^"" > '11
be indeed sericjus.
Tlie USAl" desire to introduce the UIW concept quLte early i ;




the conti nci.or to cuui. LJl r fioKl reliability on at. Icnst an equal
footJnj- v,'iih unit product. Jon cost and pcrfcMiuinca is quite under-
stan<lal)] f . CODSIA aj^rL-es , and the potential differences of opinion
relate only to the tecliUJcal methods and contractual implementation
by which this objcctivi: is to l^e accomplislied
.
o Rcason.ible Predict abiJ ity and Risk vs. Traditional Reliability
Test J_\ ( • L\ \(<ds
Industry feels that the reqirirement for Firm Fixed Price (FFP)
KlU quotations or options on production articles prior to coir.i)let ion
of the d£:ve] t-pment cycle is an unsound procurement practice for both
j'jiveiniTient and industry. Until the hardware is tested in an opera-
tional env j rouniont , with typical operational users, and in all planned
vehicl os/plaL forms , etc., reliability (the basis for a good RIW quote)
is not "re.i^^onably pri-dictable" .
Thi:^ if; especially true in today's technolojHcal environment where
very rapid ch.:ngos are the order of the day. In the avionics arena
for example, uu have, in the last 15 years, pro(;ressed frcjm larj^ely
thermionic (li.vL.-es to discrete solid state technology and on to inte-
gr.ited circuiLi'y. Intcp.ratcd circuits themselves have rapidly gone
from vatlur simi^le devLres to medium scale intej^ration , and on to
large scale integratioii . Meanwliilc? system concepts have changed from
utili::ing largely analog interfaces to today's reliance on digital
interfaces.
y\ll of tliis technological advancement appears to be moving in
the i-ig,ht direction lo greatly improve relialiility nwer tliat of earlier
generation o<(ui]->ment and the reliability predictors !:fr(?- postulating
this to be the case. Caution is urged, however, si^xe in the past
reliability predictions liave seldom if ever matched field reliability
numbers, even where similar technology has been previously fielded.
The accuracy of tlic predictions is even more questica.abl e \.'hen the
t('chnol(igy involved has not liad the Ijcnefit of a valiid comparison
between acrtual field results and prediction.
When tlio concept of reliability growth testing was conceived (i.e.,
the text-f iy.-tcf.t-f ix philosophy) it was advanced as; a moans of arriving
at a liig.li levt-1 of reliability during tlic development cycle; a level
which woulil translate into field reliability with little or no de-
gradation. Actual field experience has not borne oua these optimistic
expectations
.
One tactical radar, for example, was subjected tio tlie type of testing
ouLlin(Hl above for a total of S/^B^i hours in tlie factory. Under this
tc'sting which involved some 5''i systems, an KfBF of 361 hours was achieved
at tlu: 90% confidence level. It should be noted thai: these tests wu re




Several years later, these same radars exliibited a reliability
of only 26 MFllBF (Moan lli^^^ht Hour Between FalJurf) on one type of
aircraft and 33 MFUBF on another type of aircraft accordinc to USAF
66-1 data collection system. This represents a degradation of about
5 to 1 over the laboratory test results v;hich illustrate the uncer-
tainty Involved in predicting field MTBF based on laboratory results.
This exaTiii)le should not be taken as a condemnation of the reliability
growth test philosophy however, since this system exliibitcd a field
reliability abnut 3 times tliat of similar systems which had not been
Lhrouj^h this experience.
Tin's example is not an isJoated case. Another contemporary
tactical rad.n wliich received much emi)ha.sis on reliability during
devcloimiciiL
,
including relial>ility growth testing, again exl)ibiLed
a dogr.ulalion of 'about A to 1 from lab to field. Other exnmples have
been noted where degradation as high as 15 to 1 liave been experienced.
It should be obvious, tlierefore, that a FFP RIW quote prior to
full scale development is inordinately risky. Further a FFP KIU
goal basi'd on laboratory testing and prior to operational testing
is not a viable alternative.
l/liile the risk involved in predicting the operational MTP;!' (the
ba.'jis for a KIW quote) is certainly greatest in newly develdjietl equip-
ment, a substantial risk is still proi;ent when equipment is "simply" '
redesigned, repackaj'.ed or even utilized in a different type of vehicle.
Redesigning or repackaging may sufficiently alter cooling, vibration
and sliock modes, operator involvement, etc., in such a way a? to grossly
affect field MTHF. Simply moving tlie equipment from one type of vcln'clo
to anot.ljer may alter the environment and appreciably affect the re-
liability.
An obvious example would be the use of 66-1 data taken on a navi-
gation system in a transport aircraft and using it to predict the
reliability of that same system in a fighter aircraft. It sliould be
stated tliat the 66-1 data in itself is subject to some question as an
accurate measure of field reliability since its validity and accuracy
are affected by sucl» factors as retest OKs , consetiuent ial failures,
lack of good failure mode data, and operator-and-maintenance- induced
failures resulting from the inexperience of organic field maintenance
teams, and/or operator-users.
In addressing the general subject of risks involved with the RIVJ
concept, it is a fact that very little actual experience exists in the
use of RIW by the military. It appears that only two USAF jirogrnms l>ave
provided some limited experience.
It would appear that with the scant amount of RIW experience at hand,
it would he well to ])rocecd slowly and cautiously on RIW until a larger




In summary, the USAF motivated by valid concerns, would prefer
§n ^arly industry coiraiitinent to RIW. Industry understands this pre-
fefgnce but fears the risk involved in such a coimnitment , as exemplified
^y several recent significant procurement implementations. Happily,,
l^Qwever, we believe this USAF/industry dichotomy can be resolved to the
§§tisfaction of both partied by a contractual technique of progressive
ggglication of RIW. This technique would vary somewhat depending on
lh§ type of program involved.
g General Approach and Rationale
In situations involving the design/development/production cycle,
gn RIW cost goal (similar to a unit production cost goal) v/ould be
§et early. A meaningful or positive incentive would be tied to the
|§t§r achievement of that goal. Depending on the type of program in-
volved, the incentive would be monitory or continue participation in
|he program. In any event, the development and early production phases
^u§t include expanded development laboratory and field reliability
Resting v.'ith adequate time and funds to accomplish this testing. It
is particularly important that the Government be prepared to allow the
gQSt of adequate component testing and development ^as a separate
contract line item where appropriate) such that design tradeoffs can
be made early and on the basis of empirical data.
A properly applied RIW should have two favorable impacts on
Reliability; (1) during the critical design, development and test
phase of a program, RIT'7 should provide the opportunity for a practical
and achievable incentive to the contractor under a CPIF form of con-
tract to build reliability and maintainability into the hardware and
(2) after the equipment is operational, RIV7 should provide an incentive
for continued reliability improvement. This latter improvement is
achieved through a properly applied firm fixed price type RIW contract,
(i.e., after field-validated test results are in hand) under which
the contractor must balance the cost of continued repairs against the
cost of reliability improvement changes. In order to reduce his
total cost under the RIW it is anticipated that the contractor wi].l
indeed make field changes which will incrementally result in improved
reliability.
Of these two impacts on reliability, undoubtedly the greatest po-
tential impact is achieved during the design, development, and test
phase of a program. For this reason the USAF has, in some recent pro-
curements, requested FFF RIW options at a program milestone prior to
full scale development (FSD) of hardware.
On the other hand, industry considers the risk associated with the
premature (i.e., pre FSD & operational test) commitment to RIW on a FFP
basis to be unduly high. This is particularly true where new develop-
ment is involved, however, repackaging or use in a different application




A resolution of this dichotomy would be to establish RIW goals
only during the devclopmenc procrnm tied to a realistic Incentive if
the goals are met. The development acquisition cycle should Include
a test of production type hardware in an operational environment,
during which test field reliability would be measured. The incentive
should be baaed on how well these test results match the development
goals and the FFP RIW quote would also be based on the results of this
test.
Achievement of the developmental RTW goal would be measured agninst
actual performance of pilot production hardware (or preproduction pro-
totype liardv;are if the task is considered to be an exj^ansion/cxtension
of the development phase) in the operational use environment.
The FFP RIW would be quoted at the termination of the opcraLional
test period and would uLildze contractor-acquired and analyzed field
failure data accumulated during this test. Incentive payment would
also be based on how well the development goal matched the actual per-
formance in the operational test. It is believed that a development
program structured as outlined above would reduce tlie risk to a manage-
able level.
Procureiiients wluch involve only production of additional quantities
of hardware which had been previously fielded may be amenable to Fl'P
RIW without the test phase outlined above. This application docs not
offer optiiDum utiliijaLion of RIW however since it comes too late in
time to influence reliability during the development/design phase.
Only the results of tfie reliability growth pliase of RIW could be realized,
o Specific Approaches
In any event, the detailed mechanics of applying the proposed RIW
plan will vary somewhat depending on the type of program involved.
Three types of progr.-niis will be considered for more detailed discussion.
1 . Parallel Development Program
A. Parallel development program is defined as one in whicli two
or more competing suppliers are carried through full scale development
and at least up to the production decision point (DSARC III).
In such a program, it would be assumed that the USAF, in using
RIW, would be interested not only in the lowest possilile Of.M costs
but also in acliievemcnt of the lowest Life Cycle Cost (LCC) . RIW,. then,
is a meani; of bringing more realism to the costing of the operational
phase of the program's life cycle.
In the parallel development program, goals for total Life Cycle
Cost would be set at the beginning of the program. The competitors
would then be encouraged to trade off ualt production cost goals agiinst
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support cost goals including an RIU goal (repair cost) in order to arrive
at the lowest LCC. Competition v/ill insure that the RIW and unit pro-
duction cost goals are optimized for USAF requirements. The development
phase would then be expanded to include field tests of all competitors
hardware using either preproduction prototypes or pilot production
hardware built, for this purpose. In any event, the hardware used in
these tests V70uld be built to production drawings and with production
tooling. The tests would be conducted in an actual operational environment
and using operational type personnel. The results of those tests would
assure the USAF of the realism of the competitor's reliability claims
and would at the same time reduce the risk associated with the FFP RIW
quote for industry. No incentive is more powerful at this stage than
the desire on the part of the com.petitors to win the production award.
The USAF would then obtain more realistic (i.e., contingency-free) FFP
RIW- quotes from the competitors, and would buy production hardv;are with
RIW from the supplier offering the lowest LCC. --
Using the above technique, the risk associated with FFP RIW would
be reduced to a manageable level for industry while at the same time,
the USAF would be assured by the competition of a reliable design with
the lov/est practical RIW cost. The use of parallel development is
highly recommended wherever possible.
Although this technique requires a larger cash outlay initially.
It would no doubt result in the lowest life cycle cost in the long run.
It is recognized, however, that the initial outlay of larg^ develop-
ment funds is often viewed with a jaundiced eye by PDT&E fund custodians.
Congress and others in the approval cycle. Nevertheless this outlay,
in our judgment, must be regarded, not as out-of-pocket expense, but
rather as investment in the future, with gains to be realized and measured
in terms of enhanced equipment availability and lowered O&M costs.
2. Competitive Single Development Program
The competitive single development program is defined as one in
which competition exists only through the early stages but not to full
scale development. Because of the difficulty in obtaining the large
outlay of front end money associated with parallel development, this
is the type of program most frequently encountered in major weapons
system programs.
With the competitive single development prograiL, RIW goals would
be set early and would emphasize the importance of -reliability and
Life Cycle Cost during the critical design and development phase. In
this type program, the realism of these goals would be insured by
applying a significant monetary incentive (not penalty) to the achieve-
ment of the goal.
As in the case of parallel development, preprodiuction prototypes




irould be subjected to the field reliability test described previously.
Again the field test would be carried out in an operational environment
using military personnel.
The FFP RIV7 quote would utilize the operational MTBF determined
by the above test results. Using the same test results, the RIV7
Incentive payiaent would be based on the relationship between the goal
established early in the program and the FFP RIW established above.
With this technique, the USAF desire to introduce the RIW con-
cept early enough to influence the design would be satisfied, while
at the same time, industry's risk v;ould be reduced to a manageable
level.
3. Competitive Production Program ' " . •
Let us consider two instances of a competitive production program:
(a) In the first instance it is defined as a competitive procure-
ment of additional quantities of an article already in production
and" already fielded.
(b) The second definition of a competitive production program
is one in which there is a multi-source competition for the production
of an article developed by one firm but not yet de/aloped into opera-
tional use. We do not recommend the cipplication of RIW to either of
these programs for a number of reasons, the most significant of which
are:
1.) In the first case the potential for reliability growth
would be limited and configuration control management
would offset savings, and, in the second cited instance,
2.) Complex hardware, while lending itself to RIW by the
developer does not provide adequate data to the competition
to constitute a reasonable risk.
A. Definition of "Development" from a Technology Viewpoint
For the purpose of RIW, "development" is simply defined as any
program resulting in hardware sufficiently different in form, fit
and function from previously developed/deployed hardware as to require
a formal design and/or environmental qualification test program prior
to the device becoming operational.
This definition then applies not only to hardware involving new
advanced technology and concepts, but could also encompass the following;
(a) Redesigns of existing hardware to modernize the circuitry
(i.e., change from vacuum tube or discrete component cir-




(b) Mechanical repackaging to change the form factor for a new
application.
B. Options
The FFP RIV7 option is a firm commitment, and should be quoted
only when the MTBF/RIW Cost is "reasonably predictable" as previously
described. On programs involving development this occurs only after
reliability data has been accumulated from operational tests and analyzed
by the contractor.
1. Selective Exercise
Two definitions of "selective exercise" have been considered.
The preferable definition is one in v;hich the seller is asked to quote
FFP RIW options for successive Tl buys of equipment after completion
of the operational tests previously discussed. Industry has no ob-
jection to use of such options provided that, in consideration of
technical and economic factors, the price for the options is subject
to redetermination and adjustment at successive periods to be set
forth in the contract.
The second definition of "selective exercise" involves the case
where the buyer is permitted to apply RIW selectively to portions
of the equipment under procurement. This represents a situation which
is unsatisfactory to industry since: . .. .
(a) It presupposes commitment prior to the availability of field
MTBF data, and
(b) It may permit the buyer to select only the low reliability
portions of the equipment for the RIW. Thus, while the equipment
as a whole may exhibit quite satisfactory reliability, the supplier
is saddled with maintenance cost of the less reliable portion. It
would also seem that this would be undesirable from a government viev;-
point because of the elimination of hardware items whose field reliability
could be improved through RIW.
2. Exercise Restrictions
As outlined above, options should not be required until field re-
liability data is available. The exercise of options should be re-
stricted to purchase of RIW for successive FY buys of production hard-
ware only.
C. How Long a Warranty
The warranty period should extend for several years, the exact
time being dependent on the type of product involved and its application.
The period must be long enough to allow the development of a valid field




design changes and cost of repairs* This is the key to the "I" (improve-
ment) in RIU. Only through failure analysis and possible redesign can
improvements be made. The actual vrarranty length will depend on the
usage factor, storage time, expected failure rate, maintenance concept,
etc.
D. Tertnination of V7arranEv
The most economical approach for Che tJSAF would be to renev; the
warranty prior to the expiration of the initial warranty period. Ne-
gotiation of the warranty renewal terms must be started prior the last
year of the initial warranty period. This approach would:
1. Reduce the heavy salary and pension commitment by USAF for
support personnel
2. Minimize the need to purchase organic maintenance training
programs, maintenance handbooks, intermediate and depot level
test equipment, etc.
3. Insure continued maintenance by highly qualified, well trained
and experienced contractor personnel.
4. Eliminate the need for spare parts cataloging, inventory pipe-
lines and reduce spare LRU (Line Replacement Unit) requirements.
5. Have a gradual and manageable impact- on present organic depot
facilities and personnel since primarily ncv;er systems would
have RIV7.
• If the RIW program is terminated and organic maintenance imple-
mented, then provisions should be made in the initial procurement for



























II;_ R1W CONTRACTIl.r, BASIS ;
A. Type of Contract
To provide the flexibility needed to procure the various DoD re-
quirements, ASPR (3-AOl) has established a wide selection of contract
types. At one extreme is the firm fixed price type which is used when
thtrs Ate reasonably definite design or specification requirements and
the costs can reasonably be determined and the contractor can there-
fore accept full cost responsibility. At the other extreme is the cost
plus fixed fee type which is used v/hen the uncertainties are of such
a magnitude that costs cannot be estimated with sufficient reasonable-
ness to ensure an acceptable risk to the buyer and seller. In this
casti the fee rather than price is fixed and the contractor's cost
rcep-onsibility is minimized. ASPR (3-AOl) further states that when
th(S risk is minimal or can be predicted with an acceptable degree of
certainty, a firm fixed price contract is preferred. However, as the
uncertainties become more significant, other fixed price or cost type
contracts should be used to avoid placing too great a risk on the con-
tractor.
It is within this framework that we must look for the appropriate
contract type to be used for RIV; contracting at various stages of
equipment design development, production, and operational deplojTnent.
1. rj)T£E Design Phase
The design and development phase of any program which involves new
technology or new applications of existing technology carries with it
a significant amount of uncertainty. It has usually been the practice
for the services to contract for this phase utilizing a cost reimbursable
type of contract which is compatible with the ASPR. We have not generally
experienced, nor do v;e envision that a change is justifiable in the
basic method of contracting for research and development with the ad-
vent of RIW. In fact the uncertainties of equipment field performance,
namely MTBF, during this phase mandates the use of cost reimbursement
contracts.
2. Production Phase
We are also concerned with the method of contracting for the
next phase — Production. At this phase, without an RIW requirement,
the design and specification requirements would have been finalized
through adequate testing and the costs of production could be reason-
ably determined. However, the imposition of RIW on a fixed-price basis
at this time introduces unkno^xms of considerable magnitude. There-
fore the use of a form of cost-reimbursement contract continues to be
necessary during the production phase. A fixed price RIW contract, in
addition to being contrary to ASPR and DoD Directive 5000.1, is con-
trary to the application criteria set forth in the RIW Guidelines.




fc© §tippdr€ the equipment, and potential for reliability growth will
B6 reasonably predictable at the time the firm fixed price bid is
fiS3e; Without field reliability data, the contractor cannot reason-
fifeiy predict either the costs of support for the potential span of
fiiiability growth. If he cannot reasonably predict these items, the
f§waris and risks to industry and the government cannot be balanced
§8 fctiafe Ihey are acceptable and equitable to both.
?R§ ©ASD (I&L) memoraudum, dated 16 September 1975 which was
ifil§nded to clarify the guidelines, recognized and supported this
pSsitieh; however, enclosure I thereto seems to take an opposite
Vi§w; This enclosure states that RIW can be applied to any new
S^tiipmehti even if the design utilizes new technology and there is
ii8 previous experience. It implies that lack of actual experience
6aii Be overcome if there is adequate laboratory development time
and testing. But, it goes on to note that considerable latitude
Sxists in tailoring the terms and conditions to the uncertainties.
§6me exahjples are: (1) the reliability guarantee can be tailored,
(2) turnaround time can be varied, (3) exclusions can be adjusted
l6 fit the situation, and (4) the initial commitment can be limited
tb the initial production buy. In general, the greater the uncer-
tainties, the less stringent would be the warranty terms. If it is
ebheeded that this depth of tailoring is necessary due to uncertainties,
a ebsfe type contract for RIV7 would be more appropriate and we offer
the following alternative for your consideration.
The design and development cost reimbursable contract V70uld
appropriately contain a RIW goal with positive incentives to m.o-
tivate the contractor to apply resources to the area of equipment
reliability. This should be followed by the purchase of a limited
number of production units, either under an extension of the develop-
ment contract or an initial production contract. We feel that a
cost reimbursable type contract is most appropriate because it is
during this field-test-before warranty phase that the contractor
would be acquiring field operational data and making design improve-
ments to enhance reliability. This "bridging" phase is essential
because historically it has been proven that even the most stringent
development' testing in a lab environm.ent is not a cdnclusive quanti-
fication of the operational field environment, nor can reliable and
valid extrapolations be made from the former to the latter. In this
way the unacceptable financial risk of premature cost commitments,
is minimized during the period where there are many uncertainties,
with firm RIVJ pricing to follow when appropriate data and experience
have been completed.
B'. jjacentive Structure
DoD, in its incentive contracting guide, states that profit,





l8_the essence of incentive contfaefins. Howevef, Industry and the
government have had both good and ^ad experiences in €he use of in-
centives. The unsuccessful ones can be afeferibufeed to complex incen-
tive structures which were difficulg to adminster and were manipulated
by the parties.
In spite of these bad experiences, we beileVe that tnuleiple in-
centive cost reimbursable contracts - with proper v/dlghting between cost
incentives and demonstrated MTBF - can motivate contractors to make
trade offs between increased design costs and lower support costs in "
favor of MTBF. Properly structured incentives under the cost type
contract can achieve the same results as early fixed price RIW con-
tracts with the proper balance of risk between the contfadter and the
government
.
As incremental improvements in MTBF are mote difficult to achieve,
a curvilinear structure would theoretically be a more appropriate and
motivational form of incentive. However, to date, there has been
little, if any, use of the curvilinear incentive structure and, there-
fore, inadequate experience upon which to recommend it. Rather, we
would recommend the more conventional linear structure for use with
RIW.
C. REWARD/PENALTY RELATIONSHIP
The RIW clauses which we have observed to date in RFP and con*-
tracts are, from our perspective, using penalties rather than rewards,
to motivate the contractor. V.'e do not mean to imply that rewards by
definition are not provided, but the probability of a contractor
achieving them are slim particularly if the penalty/reward curve is
skewed toward the former.
The following are representative examples that have appeated in
recent hardware procurements:
1. Failure cause exclusions aire very limited and the contractor
must establish by "clear and convincing evidence" that any
of the exclusions are applicable. Such matters as improper
installation, operation or maintenance, as well as the nor-
mal range of events covered by force majeure are not covered.
Further, the standard of proof required would be extremely
difficult for the contractor to meet considering the fact
that the equipment will have been operated solely under the
control of military personnel.
2. Contractors are faced with accepting turn-around times (TAT)
of 15 to 20 days for complex "black-boxes" or risk being
non-responsive. Then, if they miss the TAT, they are assessed





^=^^-3. —Basic to the RIW clause is the requirement for the contractor
to repair or replace all units that fail (except for limited
apeclflc failure causes) even though caused by Service personnel.
Not only does this result in the contractor incurring expense
to repair but it also directly influences (negatively) the
operational t-flBF and therefore the associated penalties.
4. The contractor is required to guarantee an initial MTEF with
an escalating MTBF value each year through 48 months of
warranty. In the event that the MTBF guarantee is not achieved,
consignment units are to be supplied at no cost to the
government. Delivery of these units is subject to liquidated
damages of a specified percentage of unit price per day to
a maximum of a specified high percentage of the unit price.
This penalty is usually based upon a short delivery require-
ment both for in-production and out-of-production units.
If the contractor fails to achieve the guaranteed MTBF over
the life of warranty, the consignment units become the
property of the government at no additional cost.
These clauses may not be as objectionable to a contractor if
lield operational test data were available on which to base his price,
hoWeVef, without this data they may be more likely to become penalties.
dh^g again, if the implementation of RIW by fixed price contracting
Wefe delayed pending availability of field, operational test data,
the probability of a more equitable balance betv;een reward and penalty
^ould be greater and hence more acceptable to the contractor.
III. MTBF REQUIREMENT *
A. Should the Government specify a minimum MTBF? (point, growth,
or at all)
.
In considering a contractual requirement for RIW, the anticipated
MTBF is the key ingredient in determining the selling price of the RIW.
In a competitive procurement therefore, in order to insure that all
eompetitors are striving for the same reliability target, it would
feeem desirable that the government specify a minimally acceptable MTBF
goal together with a growth range (e.g., 800-1000 hours). It is recommended
that this goal be set as described in the section of this report dealing
with "Joint DoD/Industry Ombudsman". Briefly, the government would
set a tentative value for the ^ITBF goal based on applicable historical
Both MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures in operational hours) and
IffHBF (Mean Flight Hour Between Failure) have been used to determine
t^liability. We are referring here only to MTBF because it is common
practice to operate equipment at times other than during flight.
Accordingly, hours in flight may represent only a fraction of total
operatioTi tir.e. Further, the method of accurately computing iirBF
must he r-pecified, and the nr.a of running ti-.r.e mccers should be a
requirement whenever technicnlly feasible. The accuracy of any




data, etc., and release this to the cor.petitors prior to release of the
RFP for their coimnent and tuning. The IIFP HTBF goal would then re-
flect this value. Inclusion of a growth range woul<i provide flexi- '
bility to the competitors in doing their tradeoffs of unit production
cost and LCC. •
Another possible reason for the government specifying a MTBF would
be for guaranteed MTBF (GMTBF) . Industry feels that the imposition of
both RIV7 and GMTBF on the same contract places the contractor in double
jeopardy and greatly multiplies the risks involved. Of the two plans
for improvement in field reliability, the RIV; is by far the most acceptable
to Industry. In no event, however, should both plans be imposed on the
sane contract.
If a Gl'TIBF is to be used in lieu of a RIW, it is recommended that
the value be set as follows:
B. What Kind of ^fTBF " '
It is recommended that the specified >nBF be set in the same fashion
as described previously for setting the RIW price, i.e., an KIBF goal
should be sec prior to the design/development stage. Incentives should
be applied to the meeting of that goal. The firm GMTBF value should
however not be set until operational type testing has been performed
on equipment similar to production hardv;are; and the final G>rrBF value
should be based on the results of those tests. The rationale is identical
to that given for RIW in the section on "Timing of RIW Application".
Although the operational type of test is essential to the proper
setting of the GMTBF value, MIL-STD-781 reliability growth testing should
not be abandoned since it is an essential part of any development pro-
gram aiming at a high field reliability. As noted elsewhere in this
report, although HIL-STD-781 tost results have not been directly corre-
latable with field reliability, they have proven to be a means of weeding
out many failure modes during the development period, and therefore,
funding and time should continue to be supplied for these tests.
C. When Should it be Applied? Successive Targets?
Industry feels that if a OiTBF is to be used, the successive target
approach, coupled with a high degree of contractor freedom in introducing
design changes during the successive measurement periods, is the most
productive one for both industry and government.
For the government, it provides some of the same reliability growth
features inherent in the RIW concept; while for industry it provides
a realistic and attainable initial target, thus permitting time to dis-
cover some of the unknowns involved in extensive and varied field use
of the product. At the same tim.e the achievement of a higher final MTBF
value will result because of the learning tir.ie tlian would be achieved
if a point target only were involved.
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D.' 'Joint DoD/Industry Oirhudsman
We believe that a joint UoD/Industry ombudsman group, although
mutually beneficial in some situations, e.g., policy or regulation re-
view, is not appropriate for the task of "scrubbing down" MTBF require-
ments in the solicitation.
The use of an "independent consultant" (i.e., not one of the
competitors) raises questions of qualification, competency, and what
might be called "respons-ibility to client" if the consultant were to
be engaged by the government. Also, it must be recognized that such
a consultant assumed no risk under a contractually binding commitment.
For these reasons, we recommend against the use of such a consultant.
There are alternatives current available to the services which
should effectively accomplish the same end.
•
For example, the Department of Defense Directive A105.62, dated
January 6, 1976 furnishes a mechanism for reviewing requirements within
DoD and for utilization of industry input in arriving at the decision.
Subparagraph III.D.2.h(2) provides for the establishment of a Review
Board that, "Shall insure that specification requirements have been
thoroughly examined and justified for the purpose of eliminating non-
essential or unduly restrictive requirements and that the solicitation
requirements have been correlated with the operational needs."
Subparagraph III.C.2.h.(5) establishes a requirement that each
solicitation provide for industry feedback from prospective contractors
prior to the proposal due date. Also, the services have implemented
a prerelease of the RFP requirements for industry review and input.
We recommend the above methods in lieu of the ombudsman group as
a means of making industry input available to the services for their
use in arriving at a final decision. At the same time it does not




The key to verification of an operational MTBF is the definition
of failure used to compute the MTSF. This definition must include
what is counted as a failure and what is excluded as a failure. A
failure is defined as "any departure from the required performance in
excess of the allowable tolerances, defined in the equipment configura-





The contractor should not be obligated to correct, replace, or pro-
pose ECP actions at no cost to the government with respect to any hard-





(e) Aircraft (vehicle) crash
(f) Enemy action
(g) Seal broken on unit while outside contractor's control
(h) External physical damage caused by accidenta]. or wilful mis-
treatment
(i) Internal physical damage caused by accompanying external
physical damage due to mistreatment or to tampering by non-
contractor personnel
(j) Act of God
(k) Induced failures. Failures of hardware items induced by mal-
function or improper operation of outside (system interfacing)
units
(1) Consequential/incidental damages
(m) Unverified failures (i.e., the item "retest okay")
(n) Improper installaticn/operation/or maintenance
(o) Having been designed or developed or produced by others than'
the warrantor.
Repair/replacement actions taken by the contractor v;ith respect to
hardware items damages by and/or subjected to these above-excluded cir-
cumstances/clauses/conditions should be compensated by an equitable
adjustment in applicable contract provisions including but not limited
to price.
ECPs prepared to affect design changes aimed at precluding future
failures related to these excluded causes/circumstances/conditions
and/or which have the effect of changing the design and/or environmental
specifications under which the hardware item was initially procured,
should, for the purposes of RIW, be considered as relating to exclusions
and thus be subject to negotiation and equitable contract adjustment.
In RIW program management practice, there would be a presumption
that all candidate hardware items returned during the RIW period would
be covered under the warranty, and the contractor would be expected to
proceed to take those expedited actions most advantageous to the govern-
ment's operational status. However, if such actions were taken in good
faith on hardware items ultimately determined, through contractor failure
mode analyses, to be subject to any of the excluded conditions/causes/
circumstances cited above, there should be no presumtpion of his non-
entitlement to the equitable adjustment provisions of the contract.
Ill

However, the contractor must present evidence to substantiate
an exclusion and the government must have a designated individual
with the authority to approve or disapprove the exclusion. The con-
tractor should have the right to place contractor personnel at any
location at Government expense where there is evidence that O&M re-'
porting is erroneous (66-1 system) or that conditions (set forth in
Section IV. A) under which the contractor is not responsible may have
existed but were not reported.
Those units returned to the contractor, which fall under exclusions,
should be referred immediately to the ACO and PCO for resolution. Only
those failures occurring subsequent to final acceptance should be in-
cluded in the RIW Program. Only through such rigorous control can
the manufacturer assure that proper maintenance is being conducted on
his warranted item(s) . The repair cost of excluded failures should
be covered by a separate clause or contract.
All failed units returned to the contractor should be accompanied
by a statement of failure mode, operational and test data, etc. , com-
pleted accurately and comprehensively utilizing contractor recommended
testing facilities, equipment and procedures.
The verification of failure should be performed by a method agreed
to by both the government and the contractor. The use of built-in-
test (BIT), based on past BIT capability, would rule this out as an
acceptable metliod to both parties. The use of detailed acceptance
test procedures and an intermediate or depot manufacturing tester would
probably be the minimum test method for failure verification acceptable
to both parties.
2. Degree of Control, Government vs. Contractor
Interface and authority/responsibility patterns between organic
maintenance functions and warrantor must be clearly defined. The govern-
ment must be prepared in this area to make hard decisions concerning
a possible revauiping of traditional organic maintenance and support
functions now held closely by the services, in favor of an augumented
role in these areas of the design authority - viz., the contractor. This
is true because the contractor perceives his risk to be greater or less
in direct proportion to the degree and extent of his involvement in
field operations and logistics management activities. Also, because
the field reliability/design loop is best closed by the mechanism of
coherent contractor management of field service/design organization
activities.
The warrantor should have complete visibility and requisite control
over assets management (handling of hardware, recording and validation
of failure data, fault mode analysis, pipeline spares management, access
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to government records, etc.) during the field-test-before-warranty
phase as well as during the long-term RIW phase production/spares con-
tracts.
3. Timing, Responsibility Vesting
Turn-around time (TAT) for each warranted item should be agreed
to by the government and industry preferably as a range or band of
time (e.g., 21-30 days). The TAT "clock" (i.e., start of contractor
responsibility) should start upon date of receipt of the warrantable
asset(s) as verified by the. ACO's representative, at the contractor's
repair facility, also to be contractually designated.
Responsibility for control of the asset (s) should be considered
to be transferred back to the government effective with turnover to
the resident government inspection and acceptance authority at the con-
tractor's repair facility. Shipments should be made F.O.B. contractor's
plant on a Government Bill of Lading.
TAT performance should be assessed and measured over the whole
warranty population and period - not on an individual return basis.
Evaluation of TAT performance should be made on the basis of the average
of all item returns to determine that such average TAT fell within
the contractually established time band. Penalties for exceeding the
upper limit of the TAT band should be assessed only if it can be con-
clusively establislied that the delay was caused by or attributable to
gross failure, negligence or to the chronic lack of managerial diligence
on the part of the contractor's managers. Assessment of liquidated
damages in connection with TAT is unjustifiable in any case since this
would result in double jeopardy in conjunction with requirements for
consignment spares.
4. Retest O.K.
Excessive retest okay equipments are a problem to both the
government (increased pipeline, low availability) and the contractor
(cost of testing). Therefore, the government should be required to
pay the contractor for each returned equipment that retests okay. The
value should be large enough to compensate the contractor for the
cost of testing and to encourage/force the government to perform adequate
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